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Abstract

Since the end of World War II, and especially over the past three decades, there has been
a dramatic increase of interactions between international financial institutions (IFIs) and
states. This paper will explore these interactions by examining the Hashemite Kingdom
of Jordan and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This paper rests on the assumption
that the complex implications of these interactions are not yet comprehensively
understood and will move towards that goal by setting forth a collection of new
approaches to further understand IFI-state interaction. It will discuss Jordan’s economic
and political history, structural adjustment policies implemented by the IMF, and
responses and consequences of such policy on economic, cultural, and political
dimensions. Then, theories on sovereignty, identity, nationalism and colonialism will be
applied to Jordan-IMF interaction in order to suggest new ways of understanding the
implications of IFI-state interaction.
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Introduction
This paper is intended to provide new approaches to understanding the interaction
between international financial institutions (IFIs) and states. In one sense this is a
conceptual process—I apply a number of abstract theories—but in another, it is very real
and immediate. Specifically, this paper will use the case study of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Hashemite Kingdom in Jordan, centering around 1989, the
year Jordan began to interact with the IMF, to investigate IFI-state interaction. While
there are copious amount of literature on the IMF—and the IMF’s agreements with
Jordan—there has been minimal examination of how IFIs impact and alter states and
their development beyond direct policy implications. This is important because such
interaction has very real consequences for political actors and citizens of developing
states affected by new policies. While much of this paper will rest on analytical and
theoretical frameworks, we will be begin with an anecdote to place this study in context.
The Reality of the Problem
On April 19th, 1989, President George H.W. Bush met with Jordan’s King
Hussein at the White House. The late 1980s was a time of relative political calm in the
Middle East. Saddam Hussein had yet to invade Kuwait and Jordan’s relations with Israel
were at a relative calm. The two heads of state instead focused their discussion on
economic development in Jordan; the economy of the small Arab nation had been
declining throughout the 1980s. As the two men met, King Hussein received the first
word of large riots in Ma’an, a town of 25,000 people 135 miles south of Amman.
Jordanian officials had relayed the word that an estimated over 4,000 residents of Ma’an
had taken to the streets even after a curfew had begun to be enforced the previous night.
1

The curfew had not worked. Gun battles broke out between residents of Ma’an and
government forces called in enforce order. The riots soon spread to other cities in the
south, such as Kerak and Tafila. At least five people died and close to 40 were injured in
just a few days of skirmishes between angered residents and the Jordanian army in
Ma’an.1 Government buildings and automobiles were a particular target for the
protesters. The army even sent armored cars to nearby Petra to escort tourists to Amman.
While Jordan’s history with violence has been almost solely derived from such
political and ethnic struggles (namely wars with Israel and Black September, a civil war
in 1970), the uprising in Ma’an was much different. Ma’an’s residents were rioting over
price increases. Just days before the unrest, the Jordanian government and regime of King
Hussein had eliminated subsidies on goods including fuel, beverages, and cigarettes
government as part of an agreement International Monetary Fund (IMF) to provide
Jordan $275 million of loans, in exchange for reforms (called structural adjustment
policies), over the next year and a half.2 Prices increased dramatically and residents took
to the streets. King Hussein did not seem too worried. “I believe everything is under
control,'' he said while still in Washington. ''It is really the result of measures that had to
be taken. We had to take some measures and obviously the people feel them.''3
Downhill Slide
The IMF had a good financial rationale to be want to work with Jordan: the 1980s
had not been kind to the small Arab monarchy. After the oil boom in the beginning of the
1

Tyler, Patrick E. "5 Reported Killed in Jordan Riots." The Washington Post, April 20, 1989. Accessed
April 12, 2015.
2
Cowell, Alan. "5 Are Killed in South Jordan as Rioting Over Food Prices Spreads." The New York
Times. April 19, 1989. Accessed April 4, 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/1989/04/20/world/5-are-killed-insouth-jordan-as-rioting-over-food-prices-spreads.html.
3
Ibid.

2

decade, prices began to freefall and the Jordanian economy began to slump as expatriate
remittances dropped and surrounding Arab economies began to slow down. Arab foreign
aid also dried up as more funds went to support Iraq in its war with Iran.4 Internally,
Jordan had not been working to mitigate these problems. The state’s apparatus began to
grow as the government decided to protect the domestic economy by increasing subsidies
and resisting austerity measures. This stood in contrast to the strategies encouraged by
local economists IFIs which advocated for rapid economic liberalization. By April, when
President Bush and King Hussein had met, Jordan had reached the point of no return.
Though the IMF had been advising Jordan’s government on financially sound decisionmaking throughout the 1980s, it had been largely ignored. In July 1989, Jordan signed its
first Standby Agreement with the IMF and its first adjustment loan with the World Bank
in December of the same year after reaching a point when it could not pay back its debt
or borrow any more money to finance its day-to-day operations.5
The unrest in Ma’an was in response to price increases on only a handful of
goods. Therefore, it marked the beginning of a longer, intense, and more comprehensive
set of structural adjustment policies that Jordan would soon be pressured to implement in
exchanged for continued financial assistance. Subsidies are also only one part of the
IMF’s strategy; Jordan eventually signed agreements incorporating significant changes to
state-owned enterprises, public sector salaries and size, trade policy, tax policy and
collection, and pensions.6

4

Harrigan, Jane, Hamed El-Said, and Chengang Wang. "The IMF and the World Bank in Jordan: A Case
of over Optimism and Elusive Growth." The Review of International Organizations 1, no. 3 (2006): 26392. Accessed March 9, 2015.
5
Ibid., 267.
6
Ibid.
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It is important to understand that the subsidy protests of 1989 took place in
Jordan’s largely poor, Bedouin and Transjordanian south—and was only the first instance
of such anger. (The significance of this ethnic homogeneity will be explained at length
later). In 1996, the Jordanian army occupied Kerak, another Bedouin city in the south,
after protests deteriorated into riots following the immediate doubling of bread prices
after wheat subsidy elimination as part of a new round of IMF agreements.7 Rioters built
barricades, set fire to buildings, and King Hussein promised to use “an iron first on the
protesters”.8 Ma’an became a hotbed for anger against the regime again in 2002 for
similar reasons.9
Implications
Anti-government protests are nothing new and usually nothing surprising—
governments can rarely satisfy all their citizens enough to avoid all kinds of vocal or
violent responses. But what is different in Jordan is that Ma’an, Kerak—and all the
southern towns most deeply affected by subsidy cuts and most violent in their unrest—
had traditionally been bedrocks of support for the Hashemite regime.10 Since Jordan’s
independence from the British in 1946, these traditional bases of support, made up of
both Bedouins and Transjordanians, had provided “regime security” to the monarchy
through unwavering loyalty while the regime, simultaneously, provided disproportion
welfare, employment, and military opportunities to these populations.11 Many analysts
even argue this relationship has sustained the existence of the monarchy and government
7

Andoni, Lamis, and Jillian Schwedler. "Bread Riots in Jordan." Middle East Report No. 201 (1996): 40.
Ibid., 41.
9
Schwedler, Jillian. "Occupied Maan: Jordan's Closed Military Zone." Middle East Research and
Information Project, 2002, 1. Accessed March 22, 2015.
10
Ibid.
11
Greenwood, Scott. "Jordan's "New Bargain:" The Political Economy of Regime Security." Middle East
Journal 57, no. 2 (2003): 248-68. Accessed February 28, 2015. JSTOR.
8

4

throughout Jordan’s turbulent political and economic history, such as with the injection
of millions of Palestinian refugees in 1967.12 It is because of this historical alliance that
Bedouins and Transjordanians were understandably angry at the onset of IMF policy in
1989. It eliminated not only a financial advantage, but a symbol of perpetual regime
support of these populations. The existence of such noneconomic consequences of IMF
policy also serves to show either the IMF’s ignorance of complex social and culture
dynamics or the active choice to proceed with policy despite the possible effects it could
have on the continued development of the state.
Thesis and Outline
This paper will take three core bodies of literature (frameworks) and synthesize
them to develop new approach to understand IFI’s impact on states. Chapter 1 will offer a
brief overview of Jordan’s history, economy and demographic characteristics. Chapter 2
will act as a pseudo-literature review; instead of summarizing different thinking on this
issue it will outline the overarching framework of the paper, detailing the three key subframeworks (I, II, and III) that will guide all forthcoming analysis. Chapters 3 and 4 will
delve into Frameworks I and II, respectively, to examine the literature surrounding IMF
policy in Jordan. Chapter 5 forms the “core” of the main argument and analysis by
building Framework III and synthesizing Frameworks I and II from the preceding
chapters. Chapter 6 will be a brief analysis of the overarching framework, showing how
Frameworks I-III support the thesis that there are new ways to understand IFI-state
interaction.

12
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1. A Brief Overview of Jordan’s History, Economy, and Population
Jordan is a small, lower-middle income Middle Eastern country situated between
Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the West Bank. Initially recognized by the League
of Nations in 1922 as the Emirate of Transjordan, Jordan gained independence from the
British mandate in 1946. Two years later, the young country changed its name to The
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, referring to the lineage of its first king, Abdullah I. 13
Jordan is a unique case for the Arab world as it has maintained the same system of
governance— a monarchy—since independence. King Abdullah II, the current monarch,
is the great-grandson of Abdullah I. He ascended to the throne following the death of his
father, King Hussein, in 1999. This paper will largely focus on Jordan from 1989 to
present, meaning King Hussein and King Abdullah II are the two monarchs that will have
been in power during analysis of Jordan’s economy, state, and society since 1989.
Jordan’s relatively short history as a state has been defined by a number of broad
and long-lasting political, social, and economic challenges stemming from its size,
dependence on aid, near-constant influx of immigrants, and lack of natural resources.
This section will be devoted to explaining these challenges in order to contextualize post1989 Jordanian economic development and responses.14 The intersection of these

13

"Jordan - History - The Making of Transjordan." Jordan - History - The Making of Transjordan.
Accessed April 15, 2015. http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/his_transjordan.html.
14
While it would seem convenient to explain each category of these challenges (political, social, and
economic) individually, categorizing Jordanian history would lead to a misunderstanding about how certain
events have impacted the growth of the Jordanian people and state. This paper will pay special attention to
this fact and treat Jordanian history, and the challenges that Jordan has faced, as multidimensional and
fluid. In contrast, other literature only looks at economic issues, for example, as having economic
consequences (e.g. a tax increase will have a certain effect on incomes and in turn anger those affected).
But I will argue that economic policies actually have important and underestimated social and political
noneconomic consequences.
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challenges has exacerbated (if not caused) many of Jordan’s problems since its
independence, and, in turn, has spurred IFIs to interact with Jordan.
Lack of Natural Resources and Expatriate Model
First, Jordan is not well-endowed with natural resources. It has a small industrial
base, and over 90% of its land is semi-arid.15 Unlike its neighbors, it has no oil and relies
on other exports. One of Jordan’s primary exports are skilled workers, who primarily
move to Gulf States to work in oil production. This inherently leaves Jordan more
vulnerable to oil-price shocks than other countries as it is affected by both oil prices but
also oil sector employment. By the 1980s, a third of Jordan’s working population was
employed in the Gulf, amounting to 21% of GDP between the mid-1970s and 1980s16
and now hovers closer to 10% of the population, or about 600,000 Jordanians.17 This is a
relatively unusual model for such a small nation. Since this system encourages skilled
laborers to seek out jobs and paychecks outside of Jordan, the country has experienced a
decades-long brain drain in which its qualified laborers go elsewhere to find work. This is
one factor that has prevented Jordan from developing a manufacturing base.
This still remains an issue for the Jordanian economy as a whole. As works flock
elsewhere for income, real GDP per capita, in 2003 for instance, remained significantly
below the levels of the boom during the 1980s.18 The early 2000s, in contrast to the
1990s, was seemingly a time of prosperity for Jordan as new jobs were being created at
higher rates. While some of these jobs went to Jordanians, most new employment
15

Harrigan, El-Said, and Wang. "The IMF and the World Bank in Jordan”, 265.
Ibid.
17
U.S. Congress. Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations. By Jeremy Sharp. Cong. Rept. 7-5700.
Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2014.
18
Harrigan, El-Said, and Wang. "The IMF and the World Bank in Jordan”, 281.
16
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opportunities during this time were for unskilled laborers—maids, drivers, chefs, etc.—
that were quickly occupied by Arab or Asian immigrants. Educated Jordanian citizens,
despite the overall growth in the economy, did not experience a large uptick in
employment.19
Foreign Aid
Jordan is also intensely dependent on foreign aid. The country’s lack of natural
resources and high government expenditures has made it a popular target of rich nations
looking to secure and sustain a stable ally in the Middle East. The United States alone as
provided over $16 billion dollars in economic and military aid since it began assisting
Jordan in 1951, ranging from $362 million and $700 million annually over the past four
years.20 Overall foreign aid to Jordan is increasing.21 This dependence can impede a
nation’s development by incentivizing the government not to raise the funds or provide
services to its citizens. Since foreign aid comes both in the form of cash transfers and
programs (through organizations like USAID), aid can change a government’s perceived
responsibility to collect revenues and spend on programs.
Demography
Jordan has developed with a unique demographic history. Currently, about half of
Jordan’s population are of Bedouin origin. Originating on the Arabian Peninsula,

19

Rad, Sahar T. "Jordan’s Paradox of Growth without Employment: A Microcosm of the Middle East?"
Development Viewpoint 65 (August 2011): 1. Accessed April 1, 2015.
https://www.soas.ac.uk/cdpr/publications/dv/dv65.html.
20
Jeremy Sharp "Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations", 13.
21
Al-Khaldi, Mwafaq Dandan. "Impact of Foreign Aid on Economic Development in Jordan (1990-2005)."
Journal of Social Sciences 4, no. 1 (2008): 16-20. doi:10.3844/jssp.2008.16.20.
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Jordanian Bedouins began populating the East Bank before the 14th and 18th centuries.22
Most are no longer nomadic and over the past decades have settled into relatively small
villages spread out across Jordan’s vast south and eastern deserts. This population is
perceived as the most ‘native’ group in Jordan. As a whole, the Bedouins have remained
very loyal to the Hashemite monarchy and enjoy preferential state policy. The King
makes no secret of this bias: “It can be said that many of the characteristics of the
Jordanian and Arab society are found in their strongest form in Bedouin culture….indeed,
it has been said that they are the backbone of the Kingdom.”23 A note on terminology: for
this paper, any person of Bedouin descent will be referred to as “Transjordanian”. This is
the term commonly used relevant literature to describe not only Bedouins—who have
largely settled throughout Jordan’s central and southern governorates—but also “urban
Bedouins”, citizens of Bedouin decent who have moved into larger cities and do not
share a more traditional lifestyle with more rural Bedouin populations. Both of these sects
of the Transjordanians have enjoyed preferential treatment from the state since Jordan’s
independence while maintaining unwavering loyalty to the regime.
Jordan’s population is made of a number of diasporic populations—namely
Assyrians, Armenians, Circassians, Mandaens, and Chenchans. For the scope of this
paper, these groups will not factor into my analysis. Instead, the largest population group
in Jordan—Palestinians—will be very important to subsequent analysis. The vast
majority of non-Transjordanians are Palestinian. Expelled out of British-mandated

22

Mundy, Martha, and Basim Musallam. "Nomad Territory as a Factor in Defining Arabia's Boundaries."
In The Transformation of Nomadic Society in the Arab East. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
2000.
23
"The People of Jordan." The People of Jordan. Accessed April 22, 2015.
http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/people1.html.
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Palestine (modern-day Israel) after wars with Israel in 1948 and 1967, millions of
Palestinian refugees live throughout Jordan in a diverse collection if cities, villages, and
refugee camps. While the Jordanian government recognizes the approximately 3 million
registered Palestinian refugees, other estimates place the number of Palestinians in Jordan
around 4.5 million out of a total population of about 7 million citizens.24 No matter the
exact number, Palestinians make up an immense portion of the Jordanian population and
likely outnumber Transjordanians.
The massive influx of Palestinian refugees throughout Jordan’s history has not
only been an issue of numbers. It has caused an inevitable clash of cultures. Palestinians
and Transjordanians speak slightly different dialects of Arabic. Most Palestinians live in
urban areas while most of the rural south is populated by Transjordanians. Palestinians
dominate the private sector while Jordan’s lumbering bureaucracy is staffed almost solely
by loyal Transjordanians. The issue of one’s ethnic composition is an important topic of
conversation: many taxi drivers in Amman specify their heritage: “Jordanian-Jordanian”,
“Jordanian-Palestinian” (often 2nd generation), or “Palestinian-Palestinian”.25
“Palestinian-Palestinians” often specify from which part of modern-day Israel/Gaza/the
West Bank they or their family originated. This level of involuntary specificity
surrounding one’s geographic roots speaks volumes to the prevalence of the
Transjordanian/Palestinian divide in Jordan.

24

"A Kingdom of Two Halves." The Economist. March 08, 2014. Accessed March 18, 2015.
http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21598719-jordanians-chafe-emerging-americanplan-israel-palestine-kingdom.
25
Anonymous. Conversation with taxi driver, personal interview. October 8, 2013. Raw data. Taxi,
Amman, Jordan.
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2. Outline and Understanding of Frameworks
This paper would not benefit from a strictly traditional literature review
highlighting the ideas of certain thinkers around a certain subject. If this paper’s purpose
was to suggest a new set of IFI policies in Jordan, then it would require a lengthier and
more standard literature review. Instead, it aims to synthesize and combine a number of
approaches to improve how we analyze, understand, and discuss how IFIs interact with
states. Therefore, while reviewing certain ideas surrounding IFI-state interaction, this
section will explain the methodology of this paper through examining three different
frameworks that will move toward a new understanding of IFI-state interaction. I will
explain each framework, what type of thinking it exemplifies, what it lacks, and how it
fits into overarching framework.26
This paper will undertake three primary frameworks to examine IFI-state
interaction. Not all literature within these frameworks was written with the intention of
exploring this interaction; instead, this paper will apply different ideas to form a new way
of understanding IFI-state interaction. These three frameworks are as follows: I) analyses
of economic effects of economic policy; II) analyses of sociopolitical/cultural effects and
consequences of state interaction with outside economic actors; and III) theories of
changes in state development due to interaction with outside actors.
My argument is that the three frameworks listed above are the three parts of an
equation that result in new ways of understanding IFI-state interaction. As of now, these
frameworks exist narrowly; they have not been used to undertake a more comprehensive
26

I will use examples that would fit into these different frameworks. Not all of the literature discussed will
appear in later analysis, and all literature discussed in later analysis does not necessarily appear in this
overview.
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analysis of what happens when IFIs pressure a state to implement new policies. In other
words, each of these frameworks each help create a partial understanding of IFI-state
interaction.27
Overarching Explanation of Frameworks I, II, and II
Body of
Lit./Framework I

Body of Lit./Framework Body of
II
Lit./Framework III

analyses of
economic effects
of economic
policy

analyses of
sociopolitical/cultural
effects and consequences
of state interaction with
outside economic actors

theories of changes
in state development
due to interaction
with outside actors

Example

IMF reports

articles with explanations
of a domestic movement

theories on
sovereignty,
colonialism, etc.

Isolated
Significance

technocratic
understanding of
economic policies

deeper understanding of
reactions to economic
policies

abstract
understanding of
changes to a state

Synthesized
Significance

a new understanding of IFI-state interaction through a synthesis of 3
relevant types of analysis of IFI policy and its effects on states

Figure 2.1
Framework I: Analyses of Economic Effects of Economic Policy
The first framework is the most familiar—analyses of economic development
from a purely economic perspective. It will focus on the IMF’s financing programs and
conditionality policies:
IMF financing provides its members breathing room to correct balance of
payments problems: national authorities design adjustment programs in close

27

Though I believe this overarching framework generally allows for a clearly delineated disaggregation of
individual academic works into one of the three categories below, some of the literature discussed in both
this review and in later analysis may not fit decisively into one—or instead may fit into two—
subframeworks. This does not weaken the overall framework or argument. All sources I use in this paper
help develop a new understanding of IFI-state interaction, and the three-pronged framework below should
be used as a general guide for the different types of literature discussed throughout this paper
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cooperation with the IMF that are supported by IMF financing; continued
financial support is conditional on effective implementation of these programs.28
An astounding portion of the commentary on IMF responsibilities and policy is written in
the “language” of these IFIs themselves. This includes reports and briefings written
and/or sponsored by these IFIs themselves as well as other documents critiquing,
explaining, or praising IFI policies purely for how they affected a collection of economic
factors like GDP, growth, job creation, etc. Privatization and Structural Adjustment in the
Arab Countries, a collection of short policy briefs and debates by experts brought
together by the Arab Monetary Fund, IMF, UN Development Program, and UN
Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, is a prime example of this type of
literature.29 It discusses privatization’s role in the Arab World, the financial rationale for
such practices, and a number of case studies to conclude that privatization of state-owned
enterprises and overall economic liberalization are positive forces for the Arab World.
This is all very informative; indeed, IFIs need to reflect and receive third-party
perspectives from other economists and academics. But it paints an incomplete picture of
the impact privatization—and more broadly, IFI intervention—can have in a country. The
chapter entitled “Privatization in Jordan” is an example of the narrow view such literature
takes. Written by former Jordanian Deputy Prime Minister Jawad Anani, it explains how
Jordan, with the encouragement of the IMF began privatizing state-owned enterprises in
the mid-1980s. At the end of the chapter, it delves into the “problems encountered in
privatization”: legal problems, economic recession, domestic interest rates, Middle East
28

"Factsheet -- The IMF at a Glance." IMF. March 27, 2015. Accessed March 22, 2015.
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/glance.htm.
29
El-Naggar, Saʻid. Privatization and Structural Adjustment in the Arab Countries: Papers Presented at a
Seminar Held in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, December 5-7, 1988. Washington, D.C.: International
Monetary Fund, 1989.
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volatility, and disengagement with the West Bank.30 These problems are noticeably all
narrow issues with the surface-level, day-to-day process of sale of state-owned
enterprises. There is no concern for how such policies affect the state—only a
consideration for how economic policies will have economic consequences.
As mentioned, there is nothing independently wrong about this approach (and its
primary authors do not promise anything more). But this paper will argue that economic
policies do not merely have economic consequences. Therefore, this body of literature
provides a vital but only partial piece of the equation for determining how IFI policies
have affected Jordan. These briefings, reports, and documents explain and analyze the
successes and failures of IFI policy in economic terms. This will prove important in
explicating when and why the IMF began to work with Jordan and exactly what they did
in an attempt to help escape the country’s economic crises and prevent such mistakes in
the future. But it will not be able inform a discussion on the noneconomic impact IFI
policies have had in Jordan.
Framework II: Analyses of Sociopolitical/Cultural Effects and Consequences of State
Interaction with Outside Economic Actors
A second body of literature important to our discussion of IFI-state interaction is
that explicating movements, responses, and attitudes around policy changes in the
countries where the changes took place. In other words, this is the “next step”: the
technocratic literature discussed above delivers a simple framework for understanding,
literally, what IFIs do. This category is the analysis of what happened next.
Understanding the reactions to IFI policies—and the many forms they take—is vital to
comprehending how IFI policies affect states, citizens, and state-building. Like above, I
30

Said El-Naggar. Privatization and Structural Adjustment in the Arab Countries, 222.
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will not (in this section) attempt to review all the literature on responses in Jordan.
Instead, I will highlight some literature that fits into the framework.
The first section of this paper serves as a good example of how responses are
recorded and analyzed. Ma’an, the restive city in southern Jordan, has been home to
many of the more violent responses during Jordan’s agreements with IFIs. This began in
1989 with the first elimination of subsidies and subsequent price increases. Yet the same
thing happened again seven years later in 1996 when riots broke in in Ma’an, Kerak, and
other cities after bread prices doubled.31 There has even been similar activity after 2000.
Numerous articles detail what led to these protests and how the Jordanian government
reacted to them. Reports such as Andoni and Schwedler’s Bread Riots in Jordan32,
Ryan’s Peace, Bread and Riots: Jordan and the International Monetary Fund, and
similar works speak to the relationship of IFI policy, societal impact, and societal
reaction. These almost wholly focus on the riots in 1989 and 1996.
The authors who write on this issue vary in their focus on why things happened
opposed to what happened in response to economic liberalization. Andoni and Schwedler
focus on the political situation in Jordan at the time of the riots, explaining how the King
intentionally created a divide between the monarchy and the government to more easily
cast blame on elected officials. It further delves into Jordanian-Iraqi and Jordanian-Israeli
relations and the implications those relationships had on both domestic responses to IFI
policy and government action to quell protests. Other authors speculate on the reasoning
for such virulent responses to price increases and government crackdown. This type of
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analysis—as well as more elementary observations of the riots themselves— inform our
understanding of who rioted, why they rioted, and what consequences this unrest had for
Jordan’s domestic and political situation.
A different type of responses studied in this second framework involves a much
more nuanced examination in detailing domestic consequences of IFI presence and
economic policy changes. Anne Marie Baylouny’s Creating King: New Family
Associations as Welfare Providers in Liberalizing Jordan epitomizes this approach. She
argues that after the first IFI agreements in 1989, Jordanian family networks began
“reorganize...in an attempt to cope with the removal of basic social provisioning by the
state”.33 I do not want to delve too far into her arguments here as her theory will be
examined in more depth later. But this approach adds another important pillar to the
sociopolitical and cultural effects of state interaction with IFIs. Baylouny’s arguments
speak to the critical intersection of economic policy, state, and society.
This is where this second framework moves beyond the first framework of
technocratic economic analysis. As a more comprehensive way to look at domestic
changes following economic liberalization, this multifaceted analysis speaks to the
tendency of affected populations to react to changes in economic status with not only
violence and rage, but also by altering cultural characteristics of their existence. As
Baylouny argues, “the rise of family associations in Jordan was due to a confluence of
incentives affecting multiple social classes simultaneously in economic liberalization”.34
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In other words, her paper is an analysis of how economic changes affected noneconomic
entities, key to our understanding of IFI-state interaction. Other studies such as Abbas
Kelidar’s States without Foundations: The Political Evolution of State and Society in the
Arab East, use a similar framework enhance our understanding of the complicated
formation of states and societies following large upheavals. In discussing colonialism in
the Arab East, Kelidar takes an aggressively pessimistic but informative approach:
“Historians have expressed little interest in the field of ethno-politics, which is becoming
increasingly the singular approach to explain, analyse and understand the problematic
existence and evolution of the nation-state in the Arab East and elsewhere in the Third
World...The heterogeneous communities [in the post-colonial Middle East] which have
been pressed into a political mosaic may shatter, and its constituent parts embark on a
campaign to claim the future it never had”.35 Again, this is an approach to understand
how the presence and actions of outside actors (in this case, economic/cultural/political
colonizing states) can have lasting consequences on the intricate domestic makeup of a
nation. While Kelidar’s suggestion of a fragile “political mosaic” may be an overly
dramatic conclusion, it accurately represents the immense extent of change—or potential
of change—that a nation can endure after interaction with a powerful outside actors,
whether it be the colonial British or modern IFIs.36
The examples presented in this body of literature illustrate the
cultural/sociopolitical consequences of state interactions with outside (primarily
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economic) actors. This framework lays out the changes that occurred due to outside
pressure to implement drastic shifts in policy and will be contextualized by Framework I
(analysis of actual economic policies) and Framework III (theoretical ideas on
implications for the state).
Framework III: Theories of Changes in Development Due to Interaction with Outside
Actors
The last remaining facet of the overarching framework involves a body of
literature rarely association with IFIs, economic actors, or economic liberalization. It
encompasses theories on state development, specifically on state power, bureaucratic
power, identity, and nationalism. Since this framework’s application to IFI-state
interaction may not be intuitive, I will devote a significant portion of my later analysis to
explaining how we leverage these theories to help understand this complication
interaction. The examples that will be presented in this section, as well as the numerous
theories that will be discussed later in the paper, come from a wide range of scholars,
areas of academia, and periods of time. Because theories on state power and state
formation—and the focus of the state itself—have gone in and “out of fashion” over the
past 75 years, there is a multitude of diverse and contrasting studies on the changes the
state can undergo throughout different processes of its formation and existence.37
Beginning with more concrete (and less abstract) theory are the ideas put forward
in Bureaucracy and the Alternatives in World Perspective, edited by Keith Henderson
and O.P. Dwivedi. The book brings together a collection of work examining the
development of state bureaucracies and bureaucratic power in a number of areas of the
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world. The book pays special attention to the types of programs implemented by the IMF
and World Bank and sketches the impediments to such types of “de-administered
development”38 such as the growing influence of religion and traditional values in politics
and administration and other political and cultural factors affecting management of the
public sectors.39 The authors take an interesting perspective on how IFIs relate to
bureaucratic development: “The solutions offered by the ‘Washington consensus’ —
downsizing and debureaucratising — do not go to the root of the problem. The challenge
for the larger players in the development administration — the IMF and World Bank…
— is to transform their rhetoric into reality…while also tolerating and encouraging other
approaches to change.40 This take on development appears again in the book’s chapter on
the Middle East which examines the pre-modern origins of bureaucracy and shows the
roots of present-day administration while discussing the development of state
bureaucracies in terms of recent structural adjustment policies.
Another aspect of this framework is to draw parallels between IFI-state
interaction and other historical interaction of a similar nature in which one body had
superior power over another—in at least some aspects of policy-making. Colonising
Egypt by Timothy Mitchell and Colonial Effects by Joseph A. Massad are two examples
of such analysis. Mitchell attempts to explain Britain’s colonization of Egypt through a
series of abstract concepts that can relate to how IFIs select and interact with developing
nations. For Massad, although hi strongest analysis concerns the postcolonial Jordanian
military, his insights on Jordan’s development can also inform our narrower topic of
38
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study. Both Mitchell and Massad (who frequently quotes Mitchell) illustrate the body of
literature drawing on colonist-colonized dynamics to explain, more abstractly, what
happens to a state in locked into set of hierarchical and policies.
There is also, of course, an important place for more foundational theories of
state-building in this third framework. These include (though not all will be explored)
Ernest Gellner’s work on a sociocultural “high culture” which leads to development; the
socioeconomic theories of Tom Nairn which work to explain nationalism as deriving
from the rational social and economic interests of individuals; John Breuilly’s work on
the relationship between politics, past, and nationalism; and Anthony Smith’s
examination on the various thinkers and role of ethnicity in the development of the state.
A newer area of literature which will be used in this paper to examine IFI-state
interaction is that of the characteristics and possible changes to state sovereignty. While
IFIs are usually perceived to simply form a contract with debtor states, there is a more
significant exchange of sovereignty at play. Stephen Krasner’s work in Sovereignty:
Organized Hypocrisy and Alexander Cooley and Hendrik Spruyt’s Contracting States:
Sovereign Transfers ins International Relations provide theories upon which to examine
how IFIs co-opt sovereignty while interacting with states—and the implications for states
during this process.
A Final Note on Frameworks I, II, and III
The authors, articles, and theories presented in this chapter represent an array of
the thinking on possible interpretations of IFI-state interaction. Some of the works
presented (particularly in Frameworks I and II) are intended to provide a comprehensive
and more literal account of IFI policy in Jordan while shedding light on both the
20

consequences of and responses to such policy. In contrast, Framework III includes
literature that has not been published with the express intent of building theories about
what is discussed in Frameworks I and II. The next chapters will build on the overarching
framework of this paper: synthesizing Frameworks I-III to form a new understanding of
IFI-state interaction.
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3. Framework I: Jordanian Economic Development from 1989-present
We must first trace Jordan’s economic situation in the years leading up to 1989 to
understand why IFIs deemed Jordan’s situation in need of outside financial support—and
Jordan agreed. In the early 1980s, Jordan was thriving. Poverty dropped from 24% of the
population to 3% between 1980 and 1987. Real per capita GDP still grew by almost 4%
during the early 1980s despite having one of the highest population growth rates in the
world.41 But as has been discussed, Jordan’s economy—although somewhat indirectly
so—was tied to oil prices and oil sector employment. In the early 1980s, the price of oil
began to decline off its boom of the late 1970s. This immediately jolted Jordan’s
expatriate Gulf population and the nation’s fragile economy. Demand for Jordanian
workers and exports shrank as oil prices fell. Jordan’s economy began slipping towards
recession. Beginning in the mid-1980s, IFIs including the IMF began suggesting that
Jordan liberalize its financial sector, capital account and exchange regime, warning that a
failure to act would have dramatic consequences.42 But instead, the government decided
to use a countercyclical approach and increase spending for six consecutive years through
1988.43 This approach has worked in some recessions in other parts of the world, but
Jordan had not saved up the money during the preceding inflationary period to be able to
successfully spend themselves out of a recession (the typical approach to countercyclical
spending): a 111.6 million Jordanian dinar (JD) surplus in 1980 became a 141.4 million
JD deficit as early as 1983.44 Coupled with these internal issues, foreign aid from other
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Arab states began to decline as oil revenues plummeted throughout the region. Soon, the
JD was devalued as an attempt to make Jordanian exports more competitive, depreciating
more than 37% between 1988 and 1989. This was a shock in itself; Jordan’s currency had
been one of the most stable currencies in the Middle East.
The combination of these factors created an unsustainable trend for Jordan as it
found itself further in economic isolation as the 1980s progressed. By early 1989, public
debt in Jordan reached $9.5 billion USD. 45 The real GDP growth rate was -13.5% in
1989.46 Jordanian officials were not oblivious to these signals, but “it was clear that
Jordan was headed for economic collapse but the government preferred to delay taking
drastic measures”.47 By this point Jordan had entered a crisis. The government could no
longer borrow and the Central Bank could not pay back its loans to cut down on its
enormous public debt. “Jordan’s day of reckoning had come”, one scholar argued. “The
country had no choice but to resort to IMF and World Bank financial support in order to
reschedule foreign debt and restore access to badly needed credit.” 48
IFI Involvement
Jordan signed its first agreements with the IMF in July 1989 and with the World
Bank in December of the same year. These contracts immediately set in motion a series
of reforms intended to help Jordan climb out its crises. But these did not get off to a
productive start. Some of the initial recommendations backfired. For instance, the IMF
almost immediately pressured the Jordanian government to liberalize interest rates in the
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country’s financial sector. This set off a chain reaction which exacerbated the
consequences of the recession. First, this liberalization led to a sharp increase of interest
rates among many local Jordanian banks. This caused sharp competition and a drastic
increase in nonperforming loans as banks, desperate for new clients, lent to debtors who
were often unable to pay the banks back. These loans caused major insolvency issues and
even caused Petra Bank, Jordan’s second largest bank at the time, to collapse. The
government had to inject millions of dollars to meet the run on the banking sector.49
While analysts disagree about how influential the IMF’s recommendations were to the
exacerbation of the banking crisis, one thing is certain: Jordanian citizens and the
Jordanian government could not help but recognize some type of correlation between the
IMF’s arrival, recommendations, and subsequent banking catastrophe. The IMF
immediately tried to absolve itself of responsibility by arguing that the “devastating
exchange rate and banking crisis...was the negative impact of the Gulf War”—though
Iraq had not yet invaded Kuwait. 50 It was difficult for Jordan to welcome the IMF with
open arms. While the IMF had injected a considerable amount of funds in Jordan’s
coffers following the signing of the agreement in 1989, the first steps of attempted reform
could have logically caused the perception of a hegemon deciding policy for a diverse
and complex population it did not understand.
The interest rate fiasco was just one example of IFI policy clashing with some
aspect of Jordan’s economy and society. Over the 15 years of conditionality from 1989
through 2004, IFIs implemented a range of structural adjustment policies tied to certain
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conditions agreed upon at different agreements. These measures included privatization of
state-owned enterprises, elimination or reduction of various subsidies, cuts and freezes to
the public sector, and other types of reform concerning trade, taxation, banking, currency,
and more. This paper will largely focus on privatization and subsidy reform as they are
the elements of conditionality which elicited the most intense responses from the Jordan’s
state and society and represent the most fundamental policy changes instituted by IFIs.
Privatization
Jordan has undergone two phases of privatization. The first, in the early to mid1980s, occurred before the official arrival of the IMF and World Bank. The second began
in 1998 and continued after Jordan had officially “graduated” from IMF and World Bank
programs around 2008. Compared to developed nations, one of the most common
features of developing nations is the large importance placed on the role of the public
sector in providing services and products to a population. The reasons for this
predominance varies among nations, regions, and governments. But in many developing
nations, the state owns and operates an array of state-owned enterprises (SOE) which in
other parts of the world are strictly bound to the private sector. These include mining,
telecoms, transport, construction, banking, agriculture, and energy and usually enterprises
often developed in parallel with the development of the state itself. Prying SOEs from the
hands of the state has proven difficult under many circumstances across developing
regions of the world. After years of ownership by the public sector, a state may find it
difficult to relinquish control of its enterprises and sources of revenue.51
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During the post-WWII economic and political development of much of the Arab
world, the dominance of the public sector, to developing nations, was thought to make a
positive contribution to the cause their development, modernization and nationalism as
routes to escape a colonial legacy. With the exception of Israel, Iran, and Turkey, all
Arab nations were at one point colonies. And colonial powers, by definition are robust—
and admittedly augmented—iterations of a transmitted public sector; occupying
administrations were often more economically intrusive and interventionist than “the
metropole’s” parallel administration.52 More recently, Arab nations have also received
large amounts of foreign aid which sustains the perceived necessity and importance of a
bloated public sector and bureaucratic state.53 Other scholars argue that continual
American military and intelligence penetration in the region further perpetuates the idea
that state-managed (and -owned) enterprises are a valuable vehicle for economic and
political development. While this is a more indirect symbol of positive perception of the
public sector, the Arab World understandably has seen the public sector as a force for
modernization and development. Although under colonial rule such change may not have
been “good”, Arab states and societies logically recognize public enterprises as sources
of power and vehicles of social and economic change.
Independent of what the developed world has done to perpetuate the perceived
value of the public sector in the developing world, there are further internal reasons for
this belief as “a common path was for [developing nations] to inherit a public enterprise
sector at independence...and then add substantially to it” for both ideological and
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pragmatic reasons”.54 This often took a “positive” form: young governments saw the
public sector as an entity for revenue generation from which they would have a large
surplus to target high-priority areas. 55 New governments tended to reclaim public
enterprises as a nationalist instinct and inflate them in order to imbue them with a new
sense of autonomy and national identity. Every person hired into the public sector and
every unit of currency added to the state’s coffers in a post-colonial era further
empowered new governments to take ownership of their new path to development.
This inflation of the public sector also took a “negative” form: a mistrust of the
private sector. Colonial administrations provided extremely low barriers to entry stateand privately-owned firms from the colonial power so many colonized nations did not
have a well-functioning private sector. Foreign private sector activities, in turn, were
often seen as a poor cover up for just another avenue of influence for the colonizing
force. This distrust carried past independence as “the domestic private sector” still “did
not escape suspicion”.56 This convinced the state and society that the public sector should
grow and undertake more responsibility for providing services and products. The
prevalence of state-owned enterprises in newly independent Arab nations came out of
these beliefs and trends. While it is not difficult to understand why young, post-colonial
states wanted to increase the size and power of their public sector, more recent strategies
of development have overwhelmingly argued in the other direction.57 IFIs have operated
under the belief that the leaner a public sector, the better. Specifically, privatization has
targeted the business components of the public sector—the enterprises that earn revenue
54
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through the sale of goods and services. Other government activities like health,
education, justice, are often critiqued on the same grounds as SOEs, and are not usually
under consideration to be privatized.
Privatization began to gain more importance in Jordan during the 1980s as the oil
crisis led to an economic slowdown which translated pressure onto the regime to deal
with the worsening economic climate. In 1986, as IFIs began to raise concerns over
Jordan’s bleak economic future, the Jordanian government officially announced that it
would look into “trimming public involvement in commercial activities through the
actual sale of assets to private entrepreneurs”.58 This exploration began to coalesce
around the Telecommunications Corporation, the Public Transport Corporation, and the
Royal Jordanian Airline, as well as largely state-owned potash and cement industries.
Investigators found, not surprisingly, “the prevalence of a large degree of inefficiency in
the administrative and employment policies, squander of public funds, administrative
archaism, substandard services and high indebtedness, while [similar] private sector firms
were yielding higher returns and results and generating better job opportunities, given the
high level of efficiency in the administrative and employment policies”.59 This
conclusion further encouraged the urgency of privatization of SOEs. Admittedly, data
concerning privatization of SOEs is quite challenging to track down; SOEs are often
privatized in different increments as governments find buyers for various chunks of the
SOEs. There is surprisingly little scholarly work on the evolution of SOE privatization
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outside of the simple fact that a number of important SOEs were privatized in Jordan
over about two decades.
What is important about privatization, conceptually speaking, is that privatization
of SOEs in Jordan were incursions into the public sector, mostly staffed by
Transjordanians loyal to the regime—ironically, the same part of the population most
negatively affected by privatization. “The shallowness of poverty in Jordan, with many
people concentrated close to the poverty line, indicates a potentially disproportionate
increase in the number of poor in response to an economic shock,” argued representatives
from the United Nations Development Programme. “The poor made explicit reference to
the impact of utilities restructuring and privatisation on the cost of living”.60 Most of
these poor were Bedouins.
Subsidy Reform
Subsidy reform—the reduction or elimination of government subsidies—has been
a major pillar of structural adjustment policy since Jordan’s interaction with IFIs began in
in 1989.. As the IMF states in a policy brief on Subsidy Reform in the Middle East and
North Africa:
In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries, generalized price
subsidies have for many years been part of the “social compact” and are still
common, especially on food and fuels. Yet, generalized price subsidies are neither
well targeted nor cost-effective as a social protection tool...subsidies are not only
inefficient in supporting the poor, but they also impose a much heavier burden on
the public finances than more targeted social protection tools.61
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Like other aspects of state institutions in Jordan (as in many former colonies), British
colonial rule inspired the modern concept of subsidies when “heads of tribes or shaykhs
received cash allowances [from the British], along with subsidies…for allegiance to the
new regime.”62
After two decades of modest subsidy programs, the government of Jordan
increased its subsidies in the 1970s due to a number of intersectional economic factors
detailed in the previous chapter: increasing oil prices and regional economic stability, an
uptick in remittances, and an injection of thousands of wealthy Palestinians into the
Jordanian economy after Israel’s victory in the Six Day War in 1967. Like the benefits of
SOEs, subsidies mostly went to Jordan’s rural poor, a primarily Transjordanian
population. By the late 1970s, one third of Jordan’s welfare budget went to rural
Transjordanians living in southern Jordan though they comprised only about 10% of the
population.63 This shows state’s preference for—and intention to maintain the loyalty
of—these loyalists.
When Jordan signed its first agreement with the IMF in 1989, the IMF’s main
concern was Jordan’s enormous budget deficit.64 Subsidy reform was therefore a high
priority for technocrats; elimination of these artificial price mechanisms would be an
effective way to cut the budget as well as lessen any loyalty the state was “buying” from
certain populations. The first agreement included a large set of austerity measures—one
of which slashed government subsidies on fuel, beverages, and cigarettes. Prices rose
62
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sharply and immediately. The rioting began in Ma’an. Seven years later, the Jordanian
government implemented its second major economic adjustment program which
amplified and increased the measures put forward in 1989 to “streamline its budget and
bring its deficit more under control”.65 This time, the IMF wanted the Jordanian
government to focus on the bread subsidy. This commitment had become an increasing
burden for the Jordanian government as wheat prices had rose from $175 to $280 per ton
in 1995.66
Though Jordan’s economy in 1996 was much healthier than it had been in 1989,
“the public response [after the dramatic rise in bread prices in 1996] so closely resembled
that of 1989”.67 Prime Minister Karabati tried to compensate for this dramatic change and
reaction by announcing the possibility of a partial cost-of-living allowance to affected
families. Citizens, particularly Transjordanians, were generally not pleased with this
effort, seeing Karabati’s plan as a weak excuse or cop-out for a significant and painful
shift in economic policy. The king (who usually tried to distance himself from economic
disagreements) made no secret of his support for Karabati’s larger economic plan, even
“referring directly to the 1989 riots and appealing for public cooperation with the
economic adjustment process in the order to avoid a repeat of the earlier unrest.”68 The
King also made a well-publicized appearance to the headquarters of the Jordanian armed
forces in the days leading up to the official elimination of the subsidy.69 This turn of
events created a divide between large swaths of the poor Transjordanians affected by the
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price increases and the regime, though crowds largely focused their anger at the Prime
Minister, not the monarchy.70
Although the Jordanian government attempted to quell the effects of bread
subsidy reform by suggesting alternative enhancements to a kind of “‘social contract””
through [a] cost-of-living adjustment, the real effects on ordinary Jordanians were
nonetheless severe”.71 Bread prices more than doubled, and international wheat prices
kept rising, exacerbating the burden of basic foodstuff purchases for millions of poor.
And the cost-of-living allowance program, while eventually implemented, was offset by
the elimination of some dairy subsidies.72 Similar to privatization, subsidy reform had a
disproportionately negative effect on Jordan’s Transjordanians, most of whom who lived
in rural areas. The elimination of key food and fuel subsidies “created or deepened
pockets of depression” among this sect of the population.73
In the midst of Jordan’s overall poor economic situation, this new shock
exacerbated a myriad of issues for Jordanians living below the poverty line. But a second
issued caused by the elimination of subsidies had much deeper, political underpinnings.
On the surface level, this tension took the form of the riots in southern Jordan in 1989 and
1996. This was a direct, violent result of public anger over the government’s role in price
increases and the militarized response on behalf of Karabati’s government. Yet even
more revealing were the other responses: the state flexing its military muscle—a
surprisingly overt action quite dichotomous to the new set of policies intended to help
70
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Jordan grow as an economy and nation—and Karabati’s introduction of the cost-of-living
allowance. To rural Transjordanians, looked like a pathetic attempt by the government of
buying its way out of a rapid and destructive policy change.
What Next?
Privatization and subsidy reform were two important policy changes that occurred
during Jordan’s interaction with the IMF beginning in 1989. While they are only two of
many tactics, they both exemplify a unique and strained relationship between the
Jordanian state, Jordanian citizens, and outside economic actors charged with
fundamentally altering the state’s role in providing for the country. State-owned
enterprises and state subsidies came from British colonization of the region, but decades
later became chopping-block priorities. These changes had a disproportionate effect on
Transjordanians, namely poor populations and state employees. The following chapters
will explore, more in depth, the consequences and responses to these policy changes
based on sociopolitical and cultural dimensions.
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4. Framework II: Jordanian Responses and Sociopolitical/Cultural
Effects and Consequences of IFI-state Interaction
As the previous section discussed, IFIs, by way of the Jordanian government,
implemented a range of policies in Jordan through a number of agreements beginning in
1989. Some responses to these policies are obvious (and have been discussed at length so
far in this paper), namely, violent unrest due to subsidy elimination in the rural and
poorer areas of Jordan largely populated by Transjordanians. Indeed, this was one form
of response, and it will be further investigated in this section. Yet IFI policy, in reality,
had more significant consequences among the Jordanian state and society that were not
immediately recognized as reactionary responses (like protests) to an immediate shift in
government policy. Now that we have developed an understanding of the major policy
changes initiated during the 1990s, this section will explore sociopolitical and cultural
consequences that arose due to this new policy.
Deeper Implications of Violence in the South
The riots in Ma’an and other southern Jordanian cities have been widely discussed
in the media and so far in this paper. But since they immediately occurred both in
response to the 1989 and 1996 IFI agreements, these uprisings are an important reaction
and piece of our understanding of responses in the wake if IFI-state interaction. One
analyst, for instance, speculates that for many Palestinians living in Jordan, uprisings
following the elimination of subsidies harkened back to “imagery of the intifada in the
occupied territories, complete with stones flying in one direction and tear gas canisters in
the other...before the unrest came to an end, the rioters had turned their anger on targets
that seemed to reflect public hostility towards economic privation and government
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power”.74 This is an interesting perspective, bringing an important historical implication
into the discussion of an excessive use of force to quell unrest a more powerful
government. While Ryan’s analysis is somewhat hindered by the fact that a vast majority
of Ma’an residents (those affected by the price subsidies) are Bedouin Transjordanians
and did not actively participate in the 1987-1993 intifada against Israeli occupation of
Palestinian territories, the imagery argument still holds: the “iron first” King Abdullah
used to crush the protest harkened back to violent oppression of the past.
This comparison, even if only ringing true for a small swath of citizens involved
in the crackdown, has serious implications for society’s perceptions of how it sees the
role of its state. The regime had the responsibility of “selling” the policy changes to the
Jordanian people by rationalizing swift and intense policy changes as in the best interest
for the country. Governments acting alone often have difficulty doing this; explaining
how cuts in welfare spending may somehow help people in the longer term is a
counterintuitive, complex argument to make. Yet this, compounded by the fact that the
regime was only acting as the middleman under pressure for technocratic IFI policy,
made it almost impossible for the regime to remotely look like it was acting in the best
interests of the Jordanian population.
There is no doubt that the government’s actions were nominally successful; the
subsidies were permanently eliminated and the unrest was suppressed with minimal
government deaths and minimal media coverage.75 The regime even saw its actions as a
necessary “realignment” to manage the realities of a new economic landscape. This
widened the state-society divide even further as
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regime officials appear to believe that economic adjustment is non-negotiable and
that political liberalization has essentially run its course; whereas many outside of
government see economic adjustment as having gone too far already and political
liberalization as only just beginning...for many in Jordanian society, the regime's
policies too often sounded like a sellout.76
This reaction to new policy, coupled with the violent imagery associated with oppressive
government forces, drew a divide between the state and society in Jordan.
“Jordan First” Campaign
Although Ma’an has been discussed solely in terms of its unrest in response to the
1989 and 1996 agreements, the end of 2002 became a third major period of unrest for the
restive city. The 2002 skirmishes were initiated by the Jordanian military after the
assassination of an American diplomat in Amman after the army had determined that
Ma’an-linked jihadi groups had been responsible. Nonetheless, clashes between the
military and Ma’ani elements continued past the initial raids to encompass a similar
manifestation of frustration over economic and political difficulties.77
Following this most recent tension in Ma’an, King Abdullah, who had succeeded
the throne in 1999 after the death of his father, launched his first major initiative as King
to “articulate a comprehensive vision of economic and political reform” throughout the
Kingdom.78 “Jordan First”, or al-Urdun Awalan in Arabic, was a widespread public
relations campaign promoted through billboards, pins, and other types of promotional
materials, steered by a national committee appointed by the King. As the King during the
launch of the campaign:
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The programs, objectives, membership and financing of every party operating in
Jordanian territory ought to be purely Jordanian...in recent decades, Jordan has
given priority to Arab interests and not to its national interests...We have the right
to be concerned first for our own people, as every country in the world does,
which is where our “Jordan first” slogan comes from.79
This explanation of the campaign shows how it was not aimed at mending the internal
strife between societal and state actors. Instead, the palace made it a nationalist issue,
underpinned by the recent decision to raid Ma’an to find the supposed jihadi elements
responsible for the murder of the American diplomat. It focused on placing Jordan in a
solidified, national unit falling victim to the various surrounding conflicts instead of
spending its time and resources on developing the entire national economic, socially, and
politically. The committee charged with drafting the core document of the campaign
promised a “new social contract that would redefine the relationship between citizen and
the state” but the campaign failed to live up to its expectations or carry any aura of trying
to work towards mitigating domestic tension.80
Ironically, no matter number of actual aims of the campaign, it is more interesting
to study as a government reaction than as a spark of a broad social movement. The
campaign was not well understood across Jordan. A few months into the campaign, 75%
of Jordanians had heard of it, but only 16% understood that it was a campaign for a larger
strategic effort.81 This lack of clarity around the movement further reduced the campaign
to a simple slogan inevitably misinterpreted by those at all sides of the political and
economic spectrum. It fell very short being a new social contract between Jordan’s
government and society.
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The “Jordan First” campaign holds important for IFI-state interaction. On the
surface level, the campaign shows how the government thought about mending a
complex intersection of economic and political woes: it resorted to a traditional
nationalist framework to try to restore a sense of unity to the country. It did this by
forcing state and society onto the “same side” by speculating on the presence and
influence of un-Jordanian people and ideas. The state saw the strife as an opportunity to
remind Jordanians—and itself—that Jordan should come first. Yet more importantly, this
campaign gives insight into Jordan’s economic growing pains and the starkly different
perspectives of the state versus that of society, specifically on demographic boundaries.
The “Jordan First” campaign may have been largely misunderstood by Jordanian polity,
but it illustrates a weak fix the tension created by differing opinions of economic
development in Jordan. The Jordanian government was the entity signing IFI agreements
and setting its bureaucracy in motion to execute a number of policy changes affecting
large swaths of the Jordanian population. But this part of the population did not have any
direct influence into the process (and political liberalization was not seen as an important
area of reform to accompany economic liberalization).82 One academic argued that
“Jordan first” may more accurately amount to “regime security first”.83 Whether this
characterization carries much accuracy is largely irrelevant; instead, the “Jordan First”
campaign shows how the Jordanian government’s planned path to reform came in
conflict with society’s perception of the best way to move forward. Economic
liberalization became seen as vehicle designed and implemented by the ruling state
82
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apparatus at the expense of the poorest, primarily Transjordanian, populations. A
misunderstood campaign could not salvage this reality.
Transjordanian-Palestinian Divides
Some of the responses to and consequence of IFI policy in Jordan were not as
formalized as the government’s “Jordan First” campaign and instead came from
cleavages among Jordan’s population. These responses, while not as formalized, are in a
way more significant: they illustrate how changes in regime policy had consequences
beyond increased economic burdens and political frustrations. IFI policy brought to the
surface deep-seated cultural, historical, and social strife embedded among various parts
of the Jordanian population. Even more significantly, new economic policy fused
together different divides among different cleavages of Jordanian society to create even
bigger fissures. This section will explore the complex intersections between the
Transjordanian and Palestinian divide with its rural/urban and public/private influences
that surfaced during Jordanian-IFI interaction.
It is important to first understand the historical dimensions of Transjordanian
loyalty and Palestinian existence in Jordan to fathom the impact new economic policies
had on the cultural and ethnic fabric of the dynamic Jordanian population. Jordan’s
population is composed by Palestinian refugees, whom have arrived in large waves since
1948, and Bedouin Transjordanians who have occupied the land for hundreds of years.
The Hashemite monarchy is Bedouin and has historically held unwavering, loyal support
from this sect of the population. Yoav Alon argues that the structures of state relations
with Bedouin tribes during British colonization had critical implication for the
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development of Jordan—specifically how the Bedouin populations became initially allied
with the regime.
The mandate period...created a broad base of support for the state in Jordanian
society [among only Bedouin populations], something that was lacking in many
Middle Eastern countries and other new states in the colonial world. By giving
many tribesmen a clear stake in the existence of the state and the
regime…[Jordan’s authorities] created staunch supporters who proved their
loyalty in times of crisis and uncertainty...by staffing the military and
bureaucracy, content tribesmen controlled the corridors of power and came to
defend the regime against potential and actual rivals.84
This was undoubtedly an effective method for the Jordanian regime. In the fog of
independence, new citizens of Jordan naturally looked to the state (there was really no
robust private sector interaction at that point) to provide for them, protect them, and help
them prosper. Jordanian authorities saw the immense value of making a deliberate effort
to reach out to influential actors and families among the Bedouin populations to gain their
buy-in to the new Jordanian project.
During the rapid expansion of the Jordanian state in the years following
independence, state support of an important core of the tribal Bedouin population formed
the basis of this loyalty as they began to staff the military and growing Jordanian
bureaucracy. The strategy worked, and the Jordanian regime continued to harness the
power and support of Bedouin and Transjordanian populations throughout the initial
decades of its development. As Alon says, “the [modern] Jordanian power elite is small”
and derives from fruitful but narrow relations initiated at Jordan’s inception. “A few
dozen families — many shaykhly tribal families — which dominated Transjordanian in
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1946 still enjoy prominent status. Now the third generation holds power.”85 This stark
imbalance about status, power, and state treatment among the Jordanian population has
important implications for both our historical understanding of Jordan’s development and
recent interactions with IFIs.
Over Jordan’s relatively short history, the Jordanian government’s overwhelming
allegiance these populations came to be not simply the support of the Bedouin
populations but the implicit opposition to other populations, namely Palestinians. The
historical and perpetual support of Transjordanians challenged the notion that the regime
provided for and protected all citizens within Jordan’s borders, though other events
exacerbated this issue. In the late 1960s, after Israel’s crushing victory of joint Arab
forces in the Six Day War, many new Palestinian refugees in Jordan began to radicalize
in the East Bank in hopes of an eventual retaliation on Israeli targets; this marked the
founding of the Palestinian Liberation Organization’s (PLO) operations in Jordan. The
regime’s desire to expel the PLO took the form of not only suspicion of Palestinian, but
also increased support and trust for Bedouin populations—the traditional core of what
made Jordan, Jordan. By 1968, King Hussein’s regime had increasingly lost the ability to
peacefully deal with the organization, which had set up military camps and recruiting
facilities all across Jordan.86
The quest to quell Palestinian influence during this formation and radicalization
of the PLO speaks to the regime’s constant reliance and support of the Transjordanian
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population during the presence of “potential and actual rivals.”87 The regime then “opted
for a different military alternative that would implicitly select only Transjordanians for
such service—namely, the setting up of the voluntary al-Jaysh al-Sha’bi (the Popular
Army).”88 This was an astonishing move which further divided the Transjordanian and
(non-PLO) Palestinian populations. It was no secret that this voluntary military unit was
almost solely to fight militarized Palestinian guerrillas. Therefore, this recruitment effort
only attracted Transjordanians who wanted to primarily fight Palestinians. The regime
encouraged this unusually nationalist call to its bases of support by issuing “explicit
statements criticizing and condemning the [guerrillas], rumormongering, press campaigns
(especially in the military press), and the convening of tribal conferences attended by
tribal chiefs, who would be incited by government representatives.”89 In another example
of state-sponsored invigoration of the Bedouin population, a group of 200 tribal Bedouin
chiefs held a conference (endorsed by the regime) to develop a strategy for how to use the
intelligence apparatus (mukhabarat) to combat “those who defy Jordanian law”.90 This
display of coordination and loyalty between Bedouins and the regime in the 1960s and
1970s shows the deep ties between the two entities.
Urban-Rural
Another important divide among Jordanian population is that of tension between
urban and rural residents—a divide which mirrors the binary of Transjordanian and
Palestinian populations. Since Bedouins were the “first” people in Jordan’s East Bank,
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they had grown roots in most parts of the country. While there are substantial
Bedouin/Transjordanian populations in central Jordan (near Amman), there are much
higher concentrations of Bedouins in the south. Though some tribes have branches in the
north of Jordan, major cities in the south like Kerak, and Ma’an are the primary centers of
gravity for Jordan’s Bedouin population.91
After Israeli military victories in 1948 and 1967, millions of Palestinians flooded
into Jordan in search of work, shelter, and some type of new life. Palestinian refugees
were inherently “more urban, more educated, and more experienced in political
participation, and they had more exposure to the mass media (newspapers and radio)” and
for these reasons, among others, began to settle down in Jordanian cities.92 This
overwhelmingly occurred in the central and northern parts of the country, with the
highest concentrations of Palestinian populations in the Amman Governorate, Zarqa
Governorate, and Irbid Governorate, all in the central and northern parts of Jordan.93
Thousands of Palestinians were funneled (and about 10% still live) in massive refugee
camps in Jordan on the outskirts of major cities in these governorates.94 But many began
to settle in smaller towns that had room for them and the potential to grow.95
While the Palestinian narrative is usually associated the large and tragic refugee
crisis, analysis of Palestinians in Jordan often overlooks the impact of rich Palestinians
(and their capital) on Jordan’s weak economy. Based on demographics at the time, it was
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not rare to find wealthy Palestinians as 60% of the East Bank was Palestinian by the
1970s. Rich Palestinians settled in and around Amman and in cities in Jordan’s north and
began to invest in housing and the local economy. This enticed more Palestinian refugees
to settle in the surrounding areas for reasons of both cultural familiarity and economic
potential, disrupting the pre-1967 economic climate of the now-predominatelyPalestinian governorates. 96 Soon, a general perception formed among urban
Transjordanians “that the Palestinian upper and middle classes, expelled from their cities
to relatively less developed small towns in Jordan, were engaging in a nation-class
narrative of superiority over Transjordanians.”97 Indeed, the influx of Palestinian people
and capital was a surprising and unexpected jolt which, while boosting the post-war
Jordanian economy, did so while disrupting of the role of traditional economic actors and
their geographic sources of economic influence.
Private-Public
Not long after the initial influx of rich Palestinian refugees (and the expulsion of
the PLO to Lebanon) the increase in oil prices throughout the Gulf further widened the
divide between the economic and historical characteristics of Jordan’s two main
populations and “establish the contours of contemporary Jordan’s rentierism.”98 It did so
in three ways. First, the regime had to decide what to do with its increased tax revenues.
Not surprisingly, it continued a familiar pattern by transferring a good portion of the new
cash directly to tribal leaders, in a “neo-patrimonial extension of the traditional practice
of subsidizing” that “served to reinforce the bases of a shaykh’s social power at home
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whilst rendering him increasingly dependent on state resources.”99 Palestinians did not
receive any direct cash from the regime. One columnist said it is as simple as Palestinians
paying the taxes and Transjordanians consuming them.100
But at this point, a new economic vacuum had opened up due to the improving
regional economic climate. Well-educated, middle class Palestinians that had arrived
after the Six Day War had now developed roots, connections, and lives in Jordan.
Secondly, as Transjordanians continued to rely on handouts and employment from the
state, Palestinian entrepreneurs flourished in the trade and manufacturing sectors—no
specific help from the state (outside of the regime’s general endorsement of the
importance of economic growth).101 Lastly, the oil boom began to draw workers—
primarily Palestinians—to go work in the Gulf and send sums of money back to their
families in Jordan. Though often fragile, this expatriate model was very effective during
oil booms.
Since many Transjordanians were so closely tied to the regime through financial
support, state employment, and the military, it was much easier for business-oriented
Palestinians to find new opportunities to work, such as in the Gulf, during the 1970s. The
oil boom, as well as a collection of other historical factors, solidified the perception—
which quite accurately mirrored reality—that Transjordanians and Bedouins largely
controlled and benefited from the public sector, and Palestinians thrived while operating
in the private sphere, an “ethnic division of labor”.102 Palestinians, not at all entrenched in
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the public facets of the Jordanian economy, easily found another route—the potential of
the private sector—upon which to flourish.
How IFI Policy Impacted These Divides
The above analysis explains the historical, intersecting trajectories of a number of
divides among different cleavages of the Jordanian population, particularity in relation to
how different groups of Jordanian citizens interacted with the state. The development of
Jordan led two different populations—Transjordanians and Palestinians—to interact with
the Jordanian economy and state in very different ways. Beginning in 1989, when the
first agreements were signed between Jordan and IFIs, a new round of economic shocks
hit the Jordanian state and population already dealing with the consequences of these
divides and altered these long-standing relationships.
The regime’s cooperation with and implementation of IFI policy was perceived to
have reversed the intention of development of Jordan’s economic and political system.
Privatization, subsidy reform, and other cuts implicitly damaged the livelihoods of the
perpetually Transjordanian population while implicitly aiding Palestinians who had
grown roots and lives in Jordan through participation in the private sector. Furthermore,
bread subsidies, generally speaking, had benefitted poorer populations in the south,
almost exclusively populated by Bedouins who had relied on the financial support of the
state since Jordan’s independence. To the families and tribes that relied (or at least were
used to) a certain, inexpensive price of bread for decades, an immediate doubling at the
hand of their own government was not only an affront to economic well-being. It was a
belittling of the years of unwavering allegiance between the state and Transjordanians.
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Hence, elimination of state support was akin to more than an increased financial
risk; subsidy eliminations magnified the political and economic struggles that had been
brushed aside by a transactional relationship between Bedouin populations and the
state.103 New liberal economic policies shattered the underlying concepts of this contract.
And subsidies only account for a small section of this relationship: privatization and cuts
and freezes to public sector employment and wages constituted the same perceived
betrayal to the Transjordanians by their state as “Transjordanians were among the first
losers of the IMF-promoted reforms, which... [they felt] unilaterally violated the terms of
the social contract that had maintained social stability over the past...decades.”104
The impact of IFI policy on Bedouins had a positive corollary in the new
opportunities for Palestinian populations due to increased economic liberalization, a
strengthening economy, and general affinity (on the part of IFIs) to private sector
activities over that of state bureaucracy. At the onset of the IFI agreements and the
beginning of Jordan’s economic decline in the 1980s, Palestinians controlled “the bulk of
wealth in Jordan’s economy” which positioned them to greatly benefit from new, marketoriented policies.105 By 1989—although all of Jordan’s populations, to some extent, were
suffering due to poor economic conditions— Palestinians were increasingly urban,
willing and able to work abroad and send money back home, educated and skilled in
business, and less dependent on the state to sustain their livelihoods.106 Indeed, the very
purpose of these economic liberalization policies were to make it easier for those with
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capital to create wealth—shifting this perceived responsibility away from the
government—in order to increase the overall economic health of the country, including
the lives of the poorest. Whether this worked or not is a different discussion; instead, it is
important to comprehend how these new economic policies aided the part of the
population not usually supported (or intensively supportive of) the regime. IFI policies
threw a wrench in the entrenched historical and political trajectory in Jordan by largely
inversing the transactional political economy dominant in Jordan since its independence.
Ironically, as one academic argues, “those hit hardest [were] from the regime’s base of
support and crucial to the state’s own self-definition.”107
Due to the regime’s understandable reluctance to recognize or study the
demographic divide of Palestinians and Jordanians, there is a lack of data as to the
economic impact (average income, share of GDP, employment, etc.) of IFI policies on
the respective populations. Published analysis of job creation and other telling economic
factors are not usually broken down along historical or ethnic lines. Yet Palestinians
generally benefitted from these policies, and Transjordanian—illustrated by the anger in
Ma’an and cuts to state employment and budgets—did not.108
Social Responses
While these impacts cannot be quantitatively evaluated due to lack of data, there
is a body of research concerning the social responses to new economic policies by from
Transjordanian populations. This analysis speaks as a proxy to the economic impact of
IFI-state interaction by postulating on the links between Transjordanian social trends and
the economically-derived reasons such trends began. By the mid-1990s, when the effects
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of subsidies, privatization, and other IMF-sponsored policies had come to affect the lives
of millions of rural Bedouins, a trend began to develop among this population as a type of
reactive response to the new financial reality. As Anne Marie Baylouny argues in
Creating Kin: New Family Associations as Welfare Providers in Liberalizing Jordan,
those affected by economic liberalization began to resort to enhanced social coping
mechanisms to co-opt social and political power back from what used to be provided by
the state.109 This took the form of “new family associations” which were distinctively
network-based, centered away from the state, and focused on employment and welfare
opportunities for those most affected by new policy. Also called “kinship networks”,
these were new forms of social connection in Jordan following “a change in the social
rights and demarcation of duties between state and society” that came with structural
adjustment.110
New networks filled a vacuum left vacant by the state on the provisioning of
social services. Taking the form of collectively owned membership organizations
formally registered as cooperatives or charities, members of these new kinship networks
contributed to fund wherein leaders of the fund distribute resources to members of the
network for emergencies, extraordinary expenses, medical, university, and other welfare
needs.111 As may be suspected, these networks formed among Transjordanians, the
population most entrenched in Jordanian society and affected by economic liberalization.
The chart below, adapted from Baylouny’s work, illustrates this shift:112
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Transjordanians

Group welfare status, labor market position, and organizing outcomes
Group

State Welfare Status
Pre-1989

Labor Market
Position

Formal Kin
Organizing
Pre-1989

Formal Kin
Organizing
Pre-1989

Palestinians

None

Private sector:
professional services,
and regional
employment

Some:
inclusive

Yes:
inclusive

Jordanian Muslims

Complete

State employment

No

Yes:
exclusive

Rural Bedouin
communities

Complete

State employment,
agriculture

No

Yes:
exclusive

Figure 4.1
The most telling aspect of this trend is the “post-1989” split between Palestinians and
Jordanians. Palestinians simply continued their inclusive trend of using family networks
to find employment and continue to assimilate to new lives and society. As one analyst
has argued, “family became the means by which the Palestinians were able to respond to
the conditions to the diaspora.”113 This makes sense—in every culture, especially cultures
which have gone through such immense hardship and expulsion, families rely on each
other for financial support, employment opportunities, and other types of support.
Conversely, the story of Transjordanians and Bedouin communities shows an
immediate, correlated, and direct response to dramatic political and economic changes
that occurred in Jordan in 1989. The inception of an intricate network of family
associations after the first rounds of structural adjustment illustrates the complex coping
mechanisms Transjordanians resorted to as a response to economic liberalization and a
changing role of the state. Baylouny admits that although “kinship clearly has been a
113
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major element in Jordan’s history, the present phenomena...institutionalize the economic
salience” of such family and network relations.114 Services provided by such networks
are markedly and intentionally geared towards helping affected populations with anything
that will help become prepared for, or gain, employment. For instance, poorer regions of
Jordan saw a dramatic uptick in charitable nurseries, family-run centers where women
from surrounding villages drop off their children during the day while they go to work
sewing garments for export to the United States.115 Just in Ma’an, the number of these
nurseries doubled from 1993 to1999.116
More importantly, these new, economically-conscious membership networks
were intentionally distanced from the state apparatus. Though previously Transjordanian
populations were supported by both employment and welfare handouts from the state,
new family networks were intentionally run, supported, and largely populated by
members no longer able to be dependent on the state. As Baylouny argues:
Family associations are a societal trend; they...are generally little interested in the
state, instead focusing on internal redistribution. The demise of state welfare
services, combined with economic hardships caused by liberalization and the
regional recession, produced a need and opportunity for new types of economic
services and labor market connections….Political entrepreneurs used new kinship
categories that could unite sufficient numbers to address both the economic goal
of redistributive welfare for members and the political and social prestige desires
of the leaders... demonstrating a complicated connection between economic
variables and the genesis of identity institutions.117
The creation of these family associations is the manifestation of a much larger discussion
that has been covered in this paper: how new, negative economic conditions enhanced the
prevalence and importance of identity—and how identity involved allegiance to the
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state—in Jordan. IMF policies caused an immense power shift between the state and
Transjordanians populations due to a decoupling between the state and these foundations
of historical support. And not only was the state perceived to “betray” certain populations
with its implementation of IMF-sponsored policy; regime actors (some of which had been
former government employees and victims of structural adjustment) became the vehicles
by which family associations developed their effectiveness and influence. Family
associations were “established by newly prominent elites...such as former parliamentary
or cabinet members, bureaucrats, retired army officers, and directors in the large health
services sector.”118 The intellect, network, and skill of former bureaucrats aided the
development of this parallel source of social power.
In short, new family associations represented both a dramatic and timely response
to new economic policy, but also an unexpected shift in power from the public sector to
networks of familial connections. In the wake of eliminated subsidies, sliding standards
of living, freezes and cuts to state employment (a key channel of Transjordanian-regime
allegiance), family networks grew and changed to cope with this challenge It is also
worth noting that these new associations were not just a kneejerk reaction or “fad” to deal
with the immediate consequences of structural adjustment. They had long-lasting
consequences and “do not reflect but have created an identity movement in Jordan…[as
well as] enduring lines of social mobilization and identification” (emphasis added).119
Furthermore, they reinforce the notion of the declining significance—and the possible
delegitimization—of the national political arena which may pose a “larger threat to the
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state’s vision of a docile society.”120 Such shifts may have long-term and so far
unrealized consequences.
Significance
The dramatic shifts in economic policy and welfare provisioning in post-1989
Jordan had more than economic consequences. IMF-sponsored structural adjustment
policies caused a significant array of interplaying cultural, political, geographical, and
ethnic responses from both Jordanian state and society. Exemplified by imagery during
government intervention during bread riots, the “Jordan First” campaign, and historical
divides between Transjordanian and Palestinian populations, new economic policy had
unprecedented ripple effects. The rapid expansion and role of family associations
illustrate one direct response to the vacuum created by harsh IMF policies which largely
affected Transjordanian populations.
This section is the second framework for this paper. It develops the thinking on
the responses and sociopolitical/cultural consequences of IFI-state interaction. Coupled
with our technocratic understanding developed in Framework I, this chapter offers an
analysis of what happened—beyond economic and financial quantification—in post-1989
Jordan. The next chapter will complete the comprehensive examination of the IMF’s
interactions with Jordan by developing Framework II by incorporating key events,
themes, and takeaways from the preceding chapters to develop a theoretical
understanding of IFI-state interaction.
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5. Framework III: Theories of Changes in State Development Due to
Interaction with Outside Actors
Whereas frameworks I and II presented economic and academic literature on
Jordan, specifically detailing what IFIs did while in Jordan and how new economic policy
impacted different parts of Jordan’s society and state, framework III will examine
relevant theories independent of their pertinence of Jordan. While this may sound
counterintuitive, the value of this paper is to suggest to forms of understanding IFI-state
interaction through the specific case study of the IMF and Jordan. This framework tends
to describe a certain concept “pre-1989”, discussing what happened and why it changed
in 1989, and suggesting how this alteration has affected post-1989 Jordan.
In the 1980s, a worsening financial crisis and economic climate initiated the
Jordanian regime’s agreements with the IMF and subsequent endorsement of neoliberal
economic policies which targeted mostly non-Palestinian, Transjordanian populations.
Due to Jordan’s ethnically bifurcated historical development, this caused not only
backlash from traditional bedrocks of regime support and an array of other responses to
new economic liberalization, but a fundamental shift in the relationship between the
Jordanian state and society. The two previous frameworks explained pertinent aspects
Jordanian history, including the dramatic shift in political and economic power following
the state’s first agreements with IFIs in 1989. This section will take a conceptual ‘step
back’—but also a practical ‘step forward’—to synthesize these frameworks by applying
theory to understand IFI interactions with the state.
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Sovereignty
We can leverage previous work sovereignty, specifically how sovereignty relates
to international relations and international actors, to examine what happens when an IFI
begins to heavily influence policy decision of a state through a contractual agreement.
Theories on sovereignty discuss how is state is affected—territorially, economically,
politically, culturally—by outside actors. This is the first and important dimension to
framework III. Stephen Krasner’s seminal work, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy,
explores the role of sovereignty in an increasingly connected and globalized world by
arguing that “contracts as well as conventions can include invitations for external actors
to influence domestic authority structures. Rulers sign contracts because they expect to be
better off as a result of some action taken by other participants.”121 He then delves into
how the unique makeup of state cleavages can affect the effectiveness and such
agreements, which in turn can affect state sovereignty:
Values have been contested. National political leaders have been responsive to domestic
constituencies more than to international ones, and these domestic constituencies have
been committed to very different principles— anti-Semitism...multiethnicity...prodemocracy...social welfare, limited government, and so on...The international system is
unique. It lacks a hierarchical authority structure; the rulers of specific entities will be
confronted with diverse pressures from their constituencies; power is unequally
distributed.122
This is a key theoretical foundation by which to understand our discussion of Jordan. In
the past, outside accountability for the Jordanian regime was either involuntary or
nonexistent; colonial rule was forcibly applied in Transjordan and for most Jordan’s
history there had not been opportunities to enter into large-scale contracts like those with
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the IMF. The Jordanian regime did not need, in turn, to consider the “diverse pressures”
from both domestic and international constituencies for most of its history. Yet in 1989,
this changed. The regime had bought its legitimacy and political security for decades
though courting non-Palestinian contingencies, but Palestinians became, in the more
recent decades of Jordan’s development, an important economic and cultural pillar of
Jordanian society—even if the regime or regime supporters would not admit it.
Krasner’s model for understanding the implications for sovereignty in the
international system serves to show how international pressure reignited static domestic
pressures that the state had brushed off in the 1970s and 1980s. Preoccupied with purely
ethnic and military considerations of dealing with the PLO, relations with Israel, and
other Arab states, the deep divides between the social and economic statuses of
Palestinians and Bedouins became perceived as nothing more than inconvenient social
tensions that would eventually work themselves out. But as Krasner argues, “the
international system is unique”. The beginning of IMF influence throughout the regime
and policy represented a new era for the existence of the Jordanian state as it began to
hang in the balance between two extremes: real considerations of the pressures brought
upon by different domestic constituencies but also financially-induced pressure by the
IMF to substantially reform the public sector and policies that affected millions of
citizens. Figure 5.1 illustrates this new relationship.
Figure 5.1

Countervailing Pressures upon the Jordanian Regime post-1989

IMF
Apply pressure to
implement
economic reforms

The State/Regime
(Jordan)

Domestic
Constituencies
Apply pressure to
resist or accept
economic reforms
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Post-1989 Jordan was the first time that the regime had to deal with intense,
countervailing economic pressures from both internal and external sources—especially
when the requests of the external source tended to inflict damage to the livelihoods of a
primary internal source. The IMF’s intended goal was to aid in the economic
development and prosperity of the nation so Jordan could exist independently, yet
ironically, this embodied the unique challenge that arose from the name of Krasner’s
book: organized hypocrisy. The IMF—part of a larger group of IFIs tasked with
executing large-scale financial solutions for the world’s developing countries—acted in a
way that voluntarily took sovereignty away from the debtor state in order to create a
pressure sharper than that of the amalgamation of domestic constituencies. This tactic can
be seen as an attempt to solidify an admittedly ambiguous “hierarchical authority
structure” by transferring enough sovereignty from the state that the concerns from and
the tensions between domestic constituencies were rendered subversive to the IMF’s
vision of the role of neoliberal economic policies.123
Alexander Cooley and Hendrik Spruyt’s Contracting States: Sovereign Transfers
in International Relations expands on Krasner’s theory with a robust and innovative
framework on “hybrid” or “partial sovereignty”.124 Cooley and Spruyt argue that
“increasingly, nation-states are entering into agreements that involve the sharing or
surrendering of parts of their sovereign power and often leave the cession of authority
incomplete or vague.” 125 The authors use case studies (such as the decolonization
processes, military bases in foreign countries, and regional economic agreements such the
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European Union and the North American Free Trade Agreement) to illustrate how and
why states do this. Since Cooley and Spruyt do not examine organizations like the IMF
and their interactions with states, their work is an ideal starting point to examine, from a
theoretical perspective, how sovereignty can inform our conception of IFI-state
interaction. This framework on partial sovereignty can be applied Jordan pre-and post1989 in an attempt to understand how Jordan entered into a partial sovereignty with its
first interaction with the IMF.
Core to partial sovereignty are property rights, particularly “control rights” and
“use rights” concerning the use of an asset.126 Control rights allow an entity to make
decisions about the use of asset (an asset in this case being regime employees, physical
assets, capital, etc.) or “even destroy the asset.”127 In contrast, use rights designate the
right to “incur the costs and reap the benefits from the use of an asset, usually for a finite
period of time.”128 This is not a complex idea, but is has important implications. A
division of these rights unto two parties means that the use of an asset is not associated
with the consequences of using that asset. But nonetheless, Cooley and Spruyt see this
division of rights as a positive force in the international arena as allows states to “both
split and share sovereignty over especially sensitive or important assets or functions.”129
In 1989, the IMF assumed command of the control rights in Jordan’s state
apparatus. Though not occupying actual positions in the regime (like the British did prior
to Jordan’s independence), the terms of IFI-state contracting create an immense amount
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of pressure from IFIs onto state actors to conform and implement IFI’s neoliberal
policies. In essence, the cost of control rights over a nation’s assets are the cost of the
loan as part of a given agreement—and the forfeiture of that loan would be catastrophic
for a developing nation. So in a sense, these contracts are not completely voluntary. The
IMF has been very successful with this model; it has allowed it to control decisions
relating to size of the public sector, makeup of and processes of the bureaucracy,
recipients of welfare payments, cuts and freezes to programs and wages, etc. with the
promise of financial assistance. In short, a loan bought control rights, and control rights
guaranteed massive influence on important decisions affecting the state and society.
Yet in Jordan, partial sovereignty did not result in a smooth transfer of rights to an
international body. In fact, the splitting of property rights—implicit in IFI agreements
with debtor states—inflated the tensions between the Jordanian state and society and
between the regime and the IMF. This is because while the IMF assumed control rights,
the regime maintained the use rights of the state’s assets, meaning that it had to incur the
costs and deal with the ramifications of the decisions made by a different party with
control over the asset. This chart illustrates this transferring of rights via the involvement
of the IMF in 1989.
General division of asset rights pre- and post-1989
pre-1989

post-1989

control rights

Jordanian
regime

International
Monetary
Fund

use rights

Jordanian
regime

Jordanian
regime

Figure 5.2
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It should be noted that the Jordanian regime’s use rights post-1989 were not new. States
naturally must accept responsibility for their actions. But the key change is the IMF’s
assumption of control rights. Though IMF took over the decision-making process, the
designation of use rights did not shift away from the regime. While admittedly the regime
had some say over how and when IMF policy was to be implemented (and did push back
on some policies), control rights and use rights were decidedly split in post-1989 Jordan.
The state now, somewhat bizarrely, had to incur the costs of and find solutions to the
fallout from decisions it did not make with full autonomy.
This was a dramatic shift from the historical development of Jordan. Before 1989,
not only did the regime possess both control and use rights (as most states do), but the
control rights were heavily directed towards a preference of the Transjordanian
populations. This group maintained loyalty to the state because the state used its control
rights to direct a disproportionate about of its assets (state and military jobs, welfare
handouts, subsidies) to these populations. Urban Palestinians, meanwhile, faced
economic discrimination by the state but did not cause a burden on the state’s budget.
They thrived in the private sector. In other words, the regime’s possession of both control
and use rights was not an issue during Jordan’s development of the lack of costs
associated with the biased allocation of its assets. The IMF inverted this model through
policy by 1) decreasing the biased use of the regime’s assets and 2) not preparing the
state for skyrocketing costs associated with its use rights—namely the perceived
abandonment of Bedouin allegiance and subsequent unrest. This altered the relationship
between loyal populations and the state. For decades these two entities’ interests had run
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parallel. But post-1989, Transjordanian populations became a target for the state under
pressure from the IMF. This represents an unfathomable shift in state-society relations.
There are further implications to this transferal of control and use right possession
in Jordan. Contracting States argues that “the temporary duration of incomplete contracts
can allow key domestic actors to modify their preferences” they fail to acknowledge the
enormous changes a splitting of property rights can have on the development of the
state.130 Third-party allocation of control and use over assets is not a simple, tethered, and
temporary change to the state. This new relationship is, in reality, a fundamental shift
which deprived the regime of using its own rationale (try to appease concerned citizens
with the “Jordan First” campaign) and made it challenging for it to justify its own
changes. Yet it had to continue incurring the social and political costs of state policy.
This discrepancy leads to a new kind of development that permanently alters the
functions of the state and the perceived role of the state in development.
There could be a much lengthier discussion on how an analysis of sovereignty
could inform our understanding of IFI interaction. But the ideas explored here—a
changing international order and division of property rights—show the problems for
states and societies when operating under partial sovereignty. States and society operate
best together when states possess both control and use rights. Splitting the decisions over
and costs of using an asset presents outside actors—the IMF—with perverse incentives to
implement dramatic policy shifts while not enduring the costs of such actions. The
increased costs are instead put on the state now with a stifled ability to make decisions
over its assets.
130
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Colonial Application
Our new conception of IFI-state interaction can also be examined through a
colonial lens. It must be noted that I do not mean to draw any type of implicit or
unconscious comparison between colonial powers and IFIs like the IMF. There is
literature harshly critiquing IFIs, particularly IFIs on how they turn a blind eye to the
negative effects of their policies. This paper is not meant to do that. It attempts to connect
certain concepts of colonization (particularly how colonial power interacted with the state
and societies they occupied) to their conceptual parallels to IFIs. Particularly, this section
will apply Timothy Mitchell’s examination of such concepts in Colonising Egypt and
Joseph Massad’s work in Colonial Effects. The books deliver detailed accounts of
different aspects of colonial and postcolonial development in Egypt and Jordan,
respectively. While Jordan is the case study presented in this paper, theory surrounding
the impact of colonialism in neighboring states can still inform our understanding of the
impact of IFIs.
In his work on Britain’s colonial occupation of Egypt Mitchell presents an
abstract but insightful framework that we can apply to Jordan and the IMF, specifically
how IMF policies—though presented as sweeping changes to macroeconomic
government policy—had drastic effects on individual livelihoods and crossectional
cleavages among Jordan’s population. Mitchell argues that colonialism had an intense
impact on Egypt: it “was itself a power that sought to colonise: to penetrate locally,
spreading and establishing itself not only in the shape of cities and barracks, but in the
form of classrooms, journals, and works of scholarship.”131 The IMF had a similar effect
131
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on Jordan. While not at all as physically omnipresent like British colonial officers in
either Egypt or Jordan, the IMF, through the Jordanian regime, influenced local economic
behaviors and represented itself through the selling and privatization of regime-owned
entities. For example, much of the literature discussed in Framework I—explaining and
praising IMF policies—was co-written by IMF representatives and Jordanian elites,
showing how the influence of IMF ideals percolated through many avenues of the
Jordanian state and society. Mitchell may argue that this is another shared success of
British colonists and the IMF: they were able, “at the most local level to reproduce
theaters of its order and truth.”132
The core mission of the IMF is to secure financial stability, facilitate international
trade, promote high employment and sustainable economic growth, and reduce poverty
around the world.133 This lofty task is undoubtedly met with a technocratic approach: the
IMF, over its history, has learned from its mistakes and understandably wants to apply
the lessons of past successes and failures to its future cases. Language written by and
about the IMF reflects this tendency: Jordan became a “model of successful... economic
reforms”134, “another success story in the making’’135 and in 2004 the IMF’s Acting
Managing Director “commended the government for being committed to prudent
macroeconomic policies and far reaching structural reforms.”(emphasis added)136 These
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initially do not sound like suspicious or insightful ideas, but Mitchell offers a new
framework upon which to leverage this concept in relation to IFI-state interaction.
To colonise Egypt, to construct a modern kind of power, it would be necessary ‘to
determine the plan’... [to] try and re-order Egypt to appear as a world enframed.
Egypt was to be ordered up as something object-like. In other words it was to be
made picture-like and legible, rendered available to political and economic
calculation.”137
Mitchell argues that Egypt, and similar colonized nations, come objectified and, in
essence, a new “case” for the colonising power subject to political and economic
scrutiny. It is easy to recognize how the IMF approached new nations in a similar regard.
A tested, technocratic framework objectified Jordan and made it slate of new neoliberal
economic policy. The IMF was intent on thoroughly understanding the quantifiable
problems in Jordan, having advised the regime on fiscal policy throughout the 1980s.
And by 1989, the IMF saw Jordan as an object by which it could apply new ideas through
diverse and vulnerable political and economic channels. This conception of the IMF
“must be understood as more than mere improvement or ‘reform’” and instead had the
effect of “representing a realm of the conceptual, conjuring up for the first time the prior
abstractions of progress, reason, law, discipline, history...and order.”138 Instead of pure
economic intentions, the understanding of colonial Egypt fits perfectly into the IMF’s
implementation of a “modern kind of power”.139
Mitchell’s analysis also offers powerful insight into the IMF’s role in
exacerbating ethnic divides in Jordan (as explored in the previous chapter). He devotes a
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good portion of his argument to showing how responses to colonial occupation often
incorporated a sense of “othering” both neighboring nations and colonists:
The outside must be represented as negative and threatening, as the method of
maintaining meaning and order within. The outside, in this sense, is an aspect of
the inside. On closer inspection, moreover, the same opposition is found at work
within the state...the authority and self-identity of the nation-state, like that of the
city and the colonial world, are not stable, circumscribed conceptions but internal
boundaries of hierarchical separation which must be constantly policed.140
First, we know that the IMF was at the time a strong outside power invoking what was
perceived as negative change upon society. This is how many Jordanian citizens saw and
reacted to the IMF, as did the regime with the “Jordan First” campaign (a more levelheaded response to general outside forces). Opposition to ‘non-Jordanian’ influences
became a unifying force for both the regime and loyal supporters throughout many points
of Jordan’s development.
Secondly, and more importantly, Mitchell’s outside-inside paradox parallels the
complex Transjordanian-Palestinian-state relationship inside Jordan. Mitchell elaborates
on this point in a way that will inform this relationship: “the identity of a political group
is not fixed as a rigid boundary containing those inside. The inside is contingent on the
designation of an exterior...therefore, [political identity always exists] as an alreadydivided relation of self/other.”141 Figure 5.3places Jordan’s pre- and post-1989
socioeconomic development into this framework.
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Existence of Regional or Domestic “Exteriors” Important to Identity
Formation among Palestinians, Jordanians, and the regime
pre-1989 “exteriors”

changes to post-1989
“exteriors”

Net change in
“exteriors”

Palestinians

Israel; the Hashemite
regime

no longer the Hashemite
regime

Identity now less
dependent on opposition
to domestic groups

Transjordanians

Palestinians

More defined by
opposition to Palestinian
economic success

Identity now more
dependent on opposition
to domestic groups

Regime

Palestinians

shift to other regional
actors

Identity now less
dependent on opposition
to domestic groups

Figure 5.3
What is impressive about Mitchell’s framework is that it allows the economic
implications of IMF policy to be incorporated into an analysis of ‘finding an exterior’. In
pre-1989 Jordan, the regime and its supporters united over their opposition to Palestinian
interests. This was embodied by Black September but more foundationally by the
symbiotic relationship between the regime and its supporters, which distinctly excluded
Palestinians. As Joseph Massad argues in Colonial Effects, Transjordanians identity
initially “saw foreign colonial powers as the other against whom they defined
themselves…[but after 1970] saw Palestinian Jordanians as the other against whom it
defined itself...for Transjordanians, the very presence of Palestinian Jordanians in Jordan
had placed Jordanian national identity in jeopardy.”142 In other words, the non-Palestinian
base in Jordanian was in part defined by exactly that—the fact that they were not
Palestinian. Economic favoritism and political loyalty solidified this relationship.
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But with the introduction of IMF policy the regime could no longer see eye-to-eye
with its traditional bases of support. While lower barriers to trade, migration, and other
neoliberal policies implicitly aided Palestinians (who dominated the private sector),
Bedouin and Transjordanian populations began to struggle under the new IMF-endorsed
state policies. King Abdullah—who “was more of a pro-market reformer than his
father”—and his regime now had endorsed a pro-market, essentially pro-Palestinian
cause with implementation of IMF policy.143 In a sense, as the state pushed forward on
these new policies, it eliminated the Palestinian economic cause as part of its “exterior”
because these new policies greatly helped urban Palestinian populations.
Ironically, with this development in society-state relations, both Palestinians and
the regime shifted their political identities to become less defined by their historical
opposition to each other. As the regime and Palestinian populations became ‘more on the
same page’ concerning the best route for Jordan’s development, this left the regime’s
historical base of support naturally defining themselves in opposition to neoliberal
reforms and the political groups that had historically benefitted from them. Economic
liberalization, per Mitchell’s framework, “eliminated the exterior” for Palestinians and
the regime, allowing both entities to push forward on a more parallel course. The
regime’s traditional bases of support swung in the other direction, further defining their
political identity as opposition to Palestinian success, regime betrayal, and economic
liberalization. Mitchell’s framework speaks to how traditional boundaries of ethnic
identity are greatly influenced by how state and facets of society approach economic
policy shifts.
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Massad lays out another framework to build on this understanding. He postulates
that there were a series of “moments” that every nation goes through as it is colonized
which illustrate the “‘relation of forces’144 whose resolutions are determinative of the
outcome of political struggles.”145 These moments include the colonial moment,
anticolonial moment, expansion and contraction of the nation, and eventually internal
implosion.146 He argues that the first moment—the colonial moment—establishes a new
type of state framework affecting political, administrative, and bureaucratic aspects of the
original country. This moment constitutes a major shift in administrative and economic
control—“a radical discontinuity with what existed before the colonial encounter.”147
Next, the anticolonial moment occurs when “the struggle against colonial rule
becomes…when the administrative colonial framework is adopted by the colonized
and…nationalist representatives of the colonized [begin to] oversee the colonial state’s
institutions.”148 For both these moments, Jordan has a clear parallel during its own
colonization—the arrival of the British in 1921 and eventual expulsion of General John
Bagot Glubb, the British head of the army in 1956.149
This can also inform Jordanian-IMF interaction. The “colonial moment”
represents the signing of the first agreements with IMF in 1989; this immediate set a
number of policy reforms into motion, creating a new type of political and administrative
power over the Jordanian policy. The anticolonial moment is more difficult to quantify
when examining IFI-state interaction. The expulsion of Glubb and the adoption of British
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institutions into a new, independent and nationalist project could parallel Jordan’s
“graduation” from IFI agreements in 2004. But this does not tell the whole story. In fact,
the inability to draw a tight connection between Massad’s “moments” of colonialism and
the entry and exit of the IMF in Jordan speaks to the alterations of the state due to
interactions with a powerful outside actor. When the Jordanian monarchy gathered
enough political capital to push the British out and gain independence, it did so because it
was unified and had an identifiable nationalist cause. Jordanians from all echelons of
society bought into the new Jordanian project which stood in opposition to British
occupation. The undertaking “acquired immense momentum, so much so that for a time
the young King Husayn was swept by its zeal.”150
Jordan’s trajectory was different after 1989. As Mitchell showed us through the
“exterior”, the harsh policies of the IMF were not, due to overarching historical, ethnic,
and socioeconomic fissures in Jordanian society, able to unite all of Jordan like British
policy had done in the 1950s. Indeed, Jordan’s population had changed dramatically since
that point (with the addition of millions of Palestinians), and this has likely hindered such
a common identity towards a common opposition. But in any case, there has been no
definitive “anticolonial moment”—nor a conscious, organized, or common effort to
revert or adopt IMF policy as Jordan’s own—in post-1989 Jordan despite the unique
presence of the modern “colonial moment” of the first structural adjustment policies. This
shows how such interaction does not just have a temporary, contractual impact on society
and state—it is more sustained and carries greater consequences than may be believed.
Since Jordanians could not unite over the consequences of new economic policy, we can
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conclude, in part, that IMF interaction with the state widened the divide between the state
and different affected populations.
Bureaucratic Power and Nationalism
The last theory of discussion within framework III will explore the intersectional
existence of ethnicity, nationalism, state bureaucracy, and power. The theorists presented
in this section are scholars and observers of state building, state development, and how
nationalism factors into these processes. I will attempt to combine the theories of a
number of thinkers, almost all of whom appear in Anthony Smith’s Nationalism and
Modernism, in order to provide a narrative we can leverage to develop new ways of
understanding IFI-state interaction. Anthony Smith himself, in conjunction with the work
of Thomas Nairn, postulate how economic conditions affect ethnie (Smith’s term for
ethnic communities with shared history and culture) as well as how ethnie have a
understandably need to try to influence economic conditions. This is done through a
group’s development and quest for ethnic nationalism. Specifically,
Economic disparities and social deprivations are placed in the service of the wider
political purposes of ethnic communities, or of their elites, which the relevant
state authorities have suppressed or marginalised. Similarly, the extent to which a
movement can organise to press the political claims of an ethnic community,
depends in turn on the political context in which it operates.151
Smith explains Nairn’s position that ethnic communities do not development nationalism
for purely cultural reasons—there is an economic dimension at work. While this suggests
that in a functioning state, ethnie see unfair economic treatment (or a disproportionately
small fraction of state welfare) as political barriers to their development as nationalist
ethnic communities. We will use Nairn’s general framework to suggest that ethnic
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communities have an interest in working towards improving their socioeconomic
conditions as a means to develop their multifaceted nationalism as an ethnie. Other
authors corroborate this framework. John Breuilly argues that nationalism is a form of
politics in itself and to that end, tries to harness the “authentic and unique experience
which aims to regenerate societies by uncovering and realizing their inner rhythms and
energies. It does so through the rediscovery, reconstruction and appropriation of the
communal past to become the basis of a vision of collective destiny.”152
Jordan’s experience can fit into this collection of theories, especially pre-1989. As
Transjordanians began to feel the pain of the declining regional economic climate in the
1980s the monarchy recognized a hardship for this population as a struggle for Jordan
itself, drawing on a “communal past” as a way to find a “collective destiny”.153 This was
true in an economic sense, but also as a political framework. Economic competition
between Transjordanian and other populations, namely Palestinians, throughout Jordan’s
history have inspired the state to favor the Bedouin populations, seemingly because
preferential economic treatment, in Nairn’s framework, amounts to a nationalist
endorsement. The state rationalized such bias by arguing that Bedouin populations, in
particular, represented the most ‘authentic’ part of Jordanian society. Recall the King’s
statement that “it can be said that many of the characteristics of the Jordanian and Arab
society are found in their strongest form in Bedouin culture….indeed, it has been said
that they are the backbone of the Kingdom.”154 Nairn and Breuilly’s theories help show
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why ethnic groups place such high importance on economic conditions as well as the
most historical, genuine version of their ethnie.
Before 1989, Palestinians did not have such a “narrative” to rely on in Jordan.
Though Transjordanians understood the Palestinian cause (and remained generally antiIsrael) this did not mean that they wanted to help or aid the Palestinian populations upon
their arrival and immediate participation of the Jordanian economy. Nairn’s analysis
explains why: economic coordination or sympathy to Palestinians would strengthen their
ethnie, and in turn, their nationalism. This, to Transjordanians, would amount to a
nationalist threat inside their own borders. They instead relied on the state to not only
continue economic favoritism but also spread the Bedouin’s authentic cultural and social
history: after 1970, Massad argues, “urban and rural Palestinian Jordanians…[became
more] susceptible to the state’s Bedouinization of Jordanian identity.” For example, the
state used “aspects of tribal law to resolve many social disputes and to inaugurate
important social occasions” even when it involved Palestinians.155
Since we have developed how both Transjordanians and Palestinians fit into these
theories now we can discuss how this theory can inform the changes Jordan endured in
1989. Historically, the regime provided economic safety, political power, and the fuel
subsidies to Transjordanians.156 This was coupled by the state’s endorsement of the
‘Bedouin experience’—implying that it embodied the true Jordanian experience. As
Gellner may argue, Bedouin/Transjordanian nationalism may have even helped “invent”
the nation of Jordan itself. It is this inextricable linkage that helped the Jordanian state
sustain its unique relationship with its bases of support for so long. Yet in 1989, IMF
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policy eliminated subsidies, private business, and shrunk the public sector by eliminating
loyal bureaucrats. These changes did not have simply economic consequences.
Privatization, for instance was, not only “detrimental to the economic welfare of
Transjordanians” but it also “signaled a loss of bureaucratic power, which was one of the
mainstays of Transjordanian influence in the country.”157 This is an important distinction
between the first and third frameworks: the theories presented above show how the IMF’s
elimination of welfare (mostly for Transjordanians) and shrinkage of the public sector
(mostly staffed by Transjordanians) was more than just an increased economic burden.
Specifically, Smith characterizes Breuilly’s argument:
For Breuilly, the role of sub-elites has been crucial, particularly for the
important category of oppositional nationalisms in colonial territories. Under
this heading, Breuilly includes middle-level bureaucrats, officers,
professionals, traders and intellectuals… [since] professionals and
intellectuals are often thought to have played a pivotal role in nationalist
movements.158
This theoretical framework provides more insight into why the IMF’s harsh targeting of
public sector activities in Jordan had underlying implications for the nationalist identities
of the citizens populating the state. Transjordanians and Bedouins had developed a type
of nationalism over their development, at least in part due to their economic security and
association with the beginnings of the Jordanian project. The IMF’s policies dealt a direct
blow to the very professionals—what Ernest Gellner, a thinker foundational to this entire
discussion, would likely call the “high culture”159—who had carried that nationalism
through decades of state growth and development. These actors then diverted their ethnie
tendencies to other outlets, such as familial kinship networks. In short, while the IMF
157

Ibid., 267.
Smith, Nationalism and Modernism, 86.
159
Gellner, Ernest. Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983.
158

73

(and even some economic policy makers in the Jordanian government) would call the
dramatic policy shifts a resounding success for a nation dire need of positive economic
news, there are other significant cultural and nationalist consequences to rapid and
intense economic liberalization. These theories detail how shifts in bureaucratic power
and nationalism, along with the preceding discussions of sovereignty and colonialism,
provide a comprehensive theoretical framework for further understanding IFI-state
interaction.

74

6. A Summary and Synthesis of the Overarching Framework
Summary of Frameworks
This paper has presented three frameworks that comprise an overarching
framework. In this section, I will summarize these frameworks and provide a brief
synthesis on how these different bodies of literature, when analyzed together, can form
new ways of understanding IFI-state interaction through the case study of Jordan’s
interactions with the IMF. Framework I discussed literature relating to the economic
impact of IFIs. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Jordan’s economy thrived. Booming oil
prices in the Arabian Gulf aided the local economy as trade and expatriate remittances
increased, helping all socioeconomic strata of Jordan’s population. But as the 1980s came
to a close, a subsequent drop in oil prices reversed Jordan’s economic progress as the
country began to slip towards recession. By 1989, Jordan could not pay its bills and
signed its first contracts with IFIs in that year. When the IMF arrived in Jordan, it had a
number of high-priority targets through which to curb Jordan’s ballooning public sector
and budget deficit. The largesse of Jordan’s public sector was mainly due to complexity
and size of the previous British colonial administration. Privatization was one of the
main strategies the IMF used to push Jordan towards a more neoliberal economic model,
and it tried to sell of numerous state-owned enterprises that the regime had owned since
independence. IFIs saw this as one of the first steps to help a country modernize and lift
itself out of economic peril. Subsidy reform was another primary strategy the IMF used
to shrink the expenditures of the regime. Illustrated by the violence in Ma’an and other
Bedouin strongholds in southern Jordan, subsidy reform was an extremely risky
economic policy shift. The elimination and/or reduction in subsidies affected primarily
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poorer Bedouin populations that had been traditional bases of support for the regime. The
entrance of the IMF into the political economy of Jordan caused an array of new
challenges for the regime and society.
Framework II investigated these problems, specifically the responses and
consequences to new policy outside of the traditional realm of economic concerns. This
section looked at the insights gleaned from the violence in Ma’an, as well as the
government’s bizarre attempt to build unity with the “Jordan First” campaign. As was
discussed, this campaign was not well-received or understood and seemed more a weak
attempt by the regime to ‘correct’ its divisive economy policy. The section then explored
the tense, ethnic, geographic, and political divides omnipresent among Jordanian
society—specifically how IMF policy worsened Palestinian-Tranjordanian divides. These
two groups essentially exist in different realms in which Transjordanians are intensely
allied to and dependent on the state, and employed by the public sector and military.
Palestinians, in contrast, were are more urban, educated, integrated into the private sector,
and distanced from the apparatus of the Jordanian regime. IMF policy exacerbated this
tense divide. Transjordanians, including many bureaucrats whose jobs were eliminated
from the public sector, began to form familial kinship networks as a replacement to state
power and influence. For these reasons, 1989 represents a fundamental discontinuity for
the Jordan’s state and society—particularly the relationship between the two.
Framework III attempted to provide new ways of understanding IFI interaction by
building on frameworks I and II by leveraging relevant theories and concepts not
intended to inform this type of interaction. Since IFI-state interaction has not been studied
at length theoretically, this paper draws on a number of concepts that relate to the
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conceptual process of the IMF and Jordan. A discussion of sovereignty—specifically
split, partial sovereignty during a period of structural adjustment—explained how control
rights and use rights impacted the regime’s ability to fully support its different
constituencies as it had in the past. Without associating IFIs with some of the harsh
critiques of historical occupying forces, theories on colonization of Middle Eastern
countries can also be applied to the case of IFI-state interaction. Mitchell provided a
conceptual framework on the objectification of colonized nations and how economic and
political hegemony was instrumental in creating identity and “exteriors” among
colonized/affected populations. We concluded that post-1989 Transjordanian identity
became further defined by its opposition to other domestic groups. Massad suggested a
series of “colonial moments” that allowed a more comprehensive understanding of the
evolution of state and societal relations with each other and the IMF. Finally, framework
III examined theories incorporating the significance of identity and nationalism in the
creation of a state. Though the most abstract of our theoretical applications, such ideas
proved the importance of economic and political identity in the formation—and
continuity—of ethnic communities. Conversely, these theories also illustrated the
sustained and unexpected implications for forced reduction in bureaucratic power.
Synthesis
These frameworks are part of an equation that explains new approaches to
understanding IFI-state interaction through the case study of the IMF and Jordan. Prior to
this study, understanding of such interaction was largely categorized and led to a stifled
understanding of these interactions. This paper discovered, as expected, that theoretical
frameworks existent in other corners of sociology, history, and political science have
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valuable applicability to the modern evaluation of international financial institutions and
how they interact with states. These new approaches to understand IFI-state interaction
are detailed in Framework III. These are the lynchpins to a new set of approaches to
understanding IFI-state interaction. By providing the conceptual structures underpinning
an interdisciplinary examination of sovereignty, colonialism, nation-building, and
bureaucratic power, these theories offer unprecedented depth to the commonplace
characterization of IFI existence and policy. It does not aim to develop new theories—
instead, this paper has provided the basis for understanding how IFI-state interaction
parallels (and can be informed by) previous work on other topics. Through a successful
process of synthesizing the three frameworks presented, we are left with a robust set of
approach by which to further examine IFI-state interaction.
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Conclusion
Eleven years after Jordan graduated from 15 years of IMF structural adjustment
policies, economic conditions, employment opportunities, and the TransjordanianPalestinian divide continues to define the social, economic, and political dynamics of the
nation. The state is indeed smaller than in the past as King Abdullah continues to be a
pro-market reformer critical of the inefficiencies of his own regime. And citizens of
Jordan continue to define themselves along multiple dimensions. As Massad says
“Jordanian national identity (which includes in it Palestinianness and Transjordanianness)
is waiting for a new definition.”160
Although this paper did focus on the last few years of Jordanian history, it is
worth noted that Jordanian society is once again changing dramatically. Since the Arab
Spring uprising in neighboring Syria devolved into a brutal civil war, 200,000 people
have been killed and 9.5 million people have been forced from their homes.161 Many of
these 9.5 people have left Syria and many of those people have arrived in Jordan.
Approximately 630,000 Syrians have registered with UNHCR, the UN’s refugee
agency.162 But most Syrian refugees in Jordan are not registered; some estimates put the
total number of Syrian refugees in Jordan as 1.3 million, or almost 20% of Jordan’s preSyrian influx population— equivalent to the United States adding a New York City every
6 months for 4 years. 163 This new societal upheaval will have consequences for Jordan in
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the coming years. It is important to keep in mind Jordan’s current situation as we analyze
its past.
Jordan is a complex case of diverse populations, intricate relations between state
and society, and history of economic, cultural, and political shocks. This is why it has
been a valuable case for our discussion. There is no doubt that IMF involvement has—
and will continue to—affect the Jordanian state and society. The new set of approaches
presented in this paper provides a route to a deeper understanding of IFI-state interaction.
The overarching framework will continue to prove useful in examining Jordan’s altered
development—as well as the altered development of other states—during an era of a
more financial and globalized world.
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